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COULD A CIA OR FBI AGENT BE QUARTERED IN YOUR HOUSE 
DURING A WAR ON TERRORISM, IRAQ OR NORTH KOREA? 
CHRISTOPHER J. SCHMIDT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the 
United States-led coalition of nations commenced a “War on Terrorism.”  Part 
of the effort to defeat terrorism included swift and potentially longstanding 
threats to civil liberties cast in the ideal of providing national security.1  Many 
ordinary law-abiding citizens hesitate before questioning these measures, 
particularly in light of the measures’ promise of national security. 
About a year and a half into the War on Terrorism, the United States and a 
minor contingent of supporting nations commenced a war against Iraq in order 
to disarm Iraq’s alleged prohibited weapons of mass destruction and perhaps 
also to liberate the Iraqi people from a tyrannical regime.  Regardless of the 
wavering reasoning behind the war, combat began on March 19, 2003, and 
President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations on 
May 1, 2003.2  The United States continues to occupy Iraq, and its troops have 
been subjected to consistent guerrilla warfare attacks since May 1, 2003, with 
more soldiers dying after the end of major combat operations than during 
major combat.3 
Increasing threats and mounting tension between the United States and 
North Korea have existed for months concerning North Korea’s alleged 
nuclear weapons program.4  A 1994 agreement between the United States and 
 
* B.A., University of Maryland, 1998; J.D., Widener University School of Law, 2001.  Member 
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 1. For an overview of the all the measures used to confront terrorism, see University of 
Michigan, America’s War Against Terrorism, at http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/ 
usterror.html#freedom (last updated Oct. 2, 2003). 
 2. See CNN.com, War Tracker: Latest Briefing, at http//:www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/ 
iraq/war.tracker/05.01.index.html (May 1, 2003) [hereinafter Special Report]. 
 3. CNN.com, U.S. Deaths in Iraq Surpass ‘End of Major Combat’ Total, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/26/sprj.irq.intl.main/index.html (Aug. 26, 2003). 
 4. CNN.com, U.S. Rules Out One-on-One Talks, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/ 
asiapcf/east/08/27/nkorea.talks/index.html (Aug. 28, 2003). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
588 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:587 
North Korea, meant to curb North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, has 
unraveled.5  North Korea recently reactivated its nuclear weapons program, 
sparking international concern.6  North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and might drop its self-imposed ban on ballistic missile 
tests.7  After North Korea expelled international inspectors on December 31, 
2002,8 it informed the Bush Administration that it had enough plutonium to 
create six nuclear bombs.9  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also 
believes North Korea might have already produced two nuclear weapons in the 
early 1990s.10  In light of these circumstances, the Pentagon might consider 
military options11 if diplomatic efforts, such as talks between the United States, 
North Korea and four other nations, cannot resolve the crisis.12 
Suppose that in the course of these three situations13 the United States 
suspected that terrorist or military attacks would be launched from terrorist 
organizations, Iraq, or North Korea.  Because the United States is 
geographically protected by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and has relatively 
friendly and secure neighboring countries, the likelihood of a traditional air, 
sea or ground attack from terrorists, Iraq or North Korea is unlikely.  Instead, a 
potential biological, chemical or nuclear attack seems more likely.  Similar to 
the attack by the relatively small group of September 11 terrorists, a few 
 
 5. Bill Nichols, Report: N. Korea Suspected of Having 2nd Nuclear Plant, USA TODAY, 
July 21, 2003, at 5A. 
 6. CNN.com, North Korea: Nuclear Tension, at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/ 
nkorea (last visited Nov. 4, 2003). 
 7. See CNN.com, Timeline: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development, at 
http://www.cnn.com/ 2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/20/nkorea.timeline.nuclear/ (Aug. 20, 2003). 
 8. David E. Sanger, North Korea Says: It Has Made Fuel for Atom Bombs, NEW YORK 
TIMES, July 15, 2003, at 1. 
 9. Id.  See also Nichols, supra note 5. 
 10. Sanger, supra note 8.  See also Nichols, supra note 5. 
 11. Sanger, supra note 8. 
 12. Thomas Omestad, The Art of the Deal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 1, 2003, at 
21, 22. 
 13. The United States deployed approximately two hundred troops to Liberia on August 14, 
2003.  Jeff Koinange, The Marines Have Landed, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/ 
08/14/otsc.koinange/index.html (Aug. 14, 2003).  That deployment, which Congress did not 
authorize, sent troops to act in a peacekeeping capacity to stabilize the country embroiled in 
internal fighting.  Id.  By August 24, 2003, this force of Marines had left Liberia to return to ships 
sailing near the coast.  CNN.com, 150 Marines Leave Liberia, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ 
WORLD/africa/08/24/liberia.marines/index.html (Aug. 24, 2003).  The troops were not sent to 
engage in a limited or formal war against an enemy or a prospective enemy, and they remained 
there for only ten days; therefore, that deployment is not a subject of this article.  For a discussion 
of the presidential power to deploy troops abroad, see Robert F. Turner, Separation of Powers in 
Foreign Policy: The Theoretical Underpinnings, 11 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 97, 114 (1988) (noting 
that “short of declaring or launching a war against another state, the president has complete 
discretion to deploy whatever Army the Congress makes available as he deems necessary to 
protect the security of the [United States]”). 
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individuals could conduct such a catastrophic attack.  Those individuals, like 
the September 11 terrorists, could already be residing and working within an 
American community. 
If the United States had information about those individuals, an effective 
way to investigate them would be to watch them constantly.  In fact, dozens of 
“Islamic extremists” were under Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
surveillance in 2003, and the FBI was also “closely monitoring known 
members of other terrorist organizations.”14  A logical way to perform such 
surveillance would be to quarter CIA and FBI agents in homes within the 
community in which the suspected terrorists or enemy soldiers reside.  The 
United States could then observe the suspects non-stop, from as close a 
vantage point as possible. 
Alternatively, what if CIA and FBI agents’ personal residences, offices and 
other government buildings were subjected to terrorist or military threats, 
leaving agents with no place to live or work?  At that point, could CIA or FBI 
agents be quartered in your house?  While this measure, as well as the 
quartering scenario described above, could be successful, it would also appear 
to affect one of the treasured, albeit rarely invoked constitutional rights of 
citizens.  This right is the Third Amendment’s prohibition against 
nonconsensual quartering of soldiers in a person’s house during peacetime or 
wartime (although nonconsensual quartering can occur during wartime through 
a manner prescribed by law).15 
Part II of this article examines the text of the Third Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  The Third Amendment states: “No Soldier shall, in 
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor 
in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”16  Initially, the 
amendment seems straightforward.  During peacetime no soldier may be 
quartered in a house without the owner’s consent.  The same is true during 
wartime; however, in wartime, a law may be enacted setting standards for how 
soldiers may be quartered in houses.  The difficulty arises in determining 
whether CIA and FBI agents are “soldiers” and whether the United States is in 
a period of  “wartime.” 
This article will show that the broad meaning of the term “soldier” 
encompasses both CIA and FBI agents.  Furthermore, it will show that many of 
those agents perform multiple military functions similar to that of traditional 
soldiers. 
 
 14. CNN.com, FBI Readies Home Front for Wartime, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/ 
17/fbi.war/index.html (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter FBI Readies Home Front for Wartime]. 
 15. See U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 16. Id. 
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Regarding what constitutes wartime, Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the 
Constitution authorizes Congress to declare war.17  Following that mandate, 
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution describing when the President 
may introduce the armed forces into hostilities or situations where hostilities 
are imminent.18  This article describes how “war,” under both the Constitution 
and the War Powers Resolution, can exist under its ordinary meaning without 
Congress making a formal declaration of war.  However, to convert the legal 
status of the nation from peacetime to wartime, a formal declaration of war is 
required.  Thus, the Third Amendment’s text prevents compelled quartering of 
soldiers until Congress declares war.  Because Congress has not declared a war 
on terrorism, Iraq or North Korea, compelled quartering of soldiers cannot take 
place. 
Part III of this article provides a historical understanding of the Third 
Amendment.  Although the Third Amendment has rarely been applied to legal 
issues since its ratification, its historical underpinnings date back at least to the 
early 1600s in Great Britain.  In Great Britain and in the American colonies, 
compelled quartering of soldiers took place.  Consistent, forthright opposition 
to the quartering took place as well, which led to the Third Amendment’s 
ratification.  The citizen protest, while directed at traditional soldiers, opposed 
the government’s actions of quartering one of its agents in a house; thus, the 
specific type of military agent quartered is not dispositive of the citizen 
sentiment.  Finally, the founding period debate regarding whether the United 
States should have a standing army in peacetime shows a consistent citizen 
distrust of the government’s force and power.  Consequently, a Third 
Amendment jurisprudence must follow the principle against the compelled 
quartering of soldiers and the subordination of the military to the people, thus 
protecting the citizenry from the compelled quartering of CIA or FBI agents 
today. 
Part IV of this article discusses prior cases reviewing the Third 
Amendment.  The only case directly interpreting the Third Amendment is 
Engblom v. Carey.19  In Engblom, striking prison officials were allowed to 
proceed on a Third Amendment claim against the governor of New York based 
on the state’s quartering of National Guardsmen in the officials’ on-site 
residences during a strike.20  While the Court did not focus on the meaning of 
“soldier” or “wartime,” its silence was golden.  Specifically, the Court did not 
mention the Cold War, which at the time was an ongoing political conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Thus, the Court could not 
have viewed the public policy oriented Cold War as constituting wartime.  The 
 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 18. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000). 
 19. 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 20. Id. at 958-59. 
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Court did, however, broadly interpret the term “Owner” in the Third 
Amendment;21 thus, the terms “soldier” and “wartime” should also be broadly 
interpreted.  This leads to an affirmance of the textual and historical conclusion 
that CIA and FBI agents cannot be quartered in a citizen’s house without the 
owner’s consent unless Congress declares war and subsequent quartering is 
prescribed through law. 
Part V of this article examines two specific areas of constitutional law that 
are analogous to the Third Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment protects the 
people from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures.22  That 
amendment stringently protects the home from government intrusion, as well 
as prevents numerous types of agents from effectuating such searches and 
seizures.  Thus, the Third Amendment must also strongly protect the home 
from a wide range of government agents who are considered soldiers, such as 
CIA or FBI agents.  The right to privacy also supports a civil-liberties-friendly 
Third Amendment jurisprudence.  The right to privacy was formed partially 
because of the Third Amendment’s civil rights protections.23  Therefore, if the 
Third Amendment established part of the foundation for the right to privacy, 
then Third Amendment jurisprudence must continue to favor citizen privacy 
over the compelled quartering of soldiers.  Consequently, compelled quartering 
of CIA and FBI agents cannot occur in a War on Terrorism, Iraq or North 
Korea until Congress declares war, and thereafter, the quartering is prescribed 
through law. 
In contemporary constitutional disputes, there is a tremendous amount of 
material to sort through.24  While legal sources interpreting the Third 
Amendment are scant compared with other Bill of Rights provisions, there is 
sufficient material available to understand the Third Amendment.  We have the 
amendment’s text, a wealth of historical materials, a case from the modern era 
and analogous areas of the law.25  It is the goal of this article to make more 
clear the meaning of the Third Amendment. 
II.  THE THIRD AMENDMENT’S TEXT 
The Constitution’s Preamble states that the people “ordain and establish” 
the Constitution.26  Therefore, “before [the Constitution] tells us anything else, 
 
 21. Id. at 962. 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 23. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).  See also infra notes 496-505 and 
accompanying text. 
 24. Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining 
Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 169, 169-
70 (2003). 
 25. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 165 (1990). 
 26. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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it tells us why we should sit up and take notice [of it].”27  Specifically, the 
Constitution declares itself the supreme law of the land and requires judges to 
support it through oath or affirmation,28 thereby declaring itself “king.”29  We 
must remember that the words of the Constitution have been authoritatively 
adopted.30  Consequently, a constitutional analysis begins with the 
“constitutional text speaking to [the] precise question.”31  In other words, “the 
text itself is an obvious starting point of legal analysis.”32  As Akhil Reed 
Amar put it: “[i]s it even possible to deduce the spirit of a law without looking 
at its letter?”33 
A. Why the Third Amendment’s Text Must Start the Analysis 
When analyzing the Third Amendment, this article will begin with the 
Third Amendment’s text.  It provides: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be 
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, 
but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”34  Because there is little Third 
Amendment precedent to address, a return to the amendment’s text is not a 
lofty goal, but a necessary starting point when analyzing it.  “The absence of 
any case law directly construing [the amendment] presents a serious 
interpretive problem;”35 thus, the amendment’s language and analogous areas 
of law must be analyzed.36  Because of the lack of material analyzing the 
amendment’s text, its words bear more importance here.  Even for those who 
usually eschew an amendment’s text to a footnote with the bulk of the analysis 
involving doctrinal precedent, the text must be confronted here to fairly 
address the amendment.  Few established principles or standards exist beyond 
the Third Amendment’s text, therefore the text must be studied and explained 
to establish a subsequent legal methodology for it. 
This is an appropriate analytical paradigm because “it is always possible in 
[] constitutional discourse to appeal behind . . . [doctrinal precedent] to the 
document itself, to challenge current wisdom” with what the Constitution 
 
 27. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 
34 (2000). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 29. Amar, supra note 27, at 33. 
 30. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 31. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).  See also John Randolph Prince, 
Forgetting the Lyrics and Changing the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and Textual Infidelity, 
104 DICK. L. REV. 1, 17 (1999) (noting the Supreme Court should start its analysis with an 
amendment’s words, not with “implicit principles”). 
 32. Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1143 
(1998). 
 33. Id. 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 35. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 36. Id. 
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commands.37  Although the text of the amendment holds special importance, “a 
technical and literal reading” of it must be rejected.38  A wholly textualist form 
of jurisprudence provides the weakest restraints and is an inappropriate 
invitation to creativity because broadly phrased terms allow one to use those 
provisions in whatever way desired.39  We must also remember the Third 
Amendment was written in a world with a political language distinct from our 
own.40  In order to translate the Third Amendment’s meaning into terms 
relevant in our modern political world, we need to trace its meaning through 
history, case law and analogous area of the law.  Therefore, this article’s 
analysis begins with and conforms to the Third Amendment’s text, for 
“supplementing [the analysis with] judicial opinions, legal writings and other 
relevant information is acceptable as long as  [they conform to] the text.”41 
B. Rejecting Original Intent to Evaluate the Third Amendment 
Because the United States has a written Constitution, we must commit to 
following its written text, not what we think those who wrote it meant.42  What 
legislators believe a law means is irrelevant.43  Whether we interpret the 
Constitution or a statute, it is “the original meaning of its text [that is 
analyzed], not what the original draftsmen intended.”44  “The law is what the 
law says, and we should [be content] with reading it rather than 
psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.”45 
 
 37. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 697 (1987). 
 38. Engblom, 677 F.2d at 962. 
 39. David A. Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1153, 1157 (1998). 
 40. Powell, supra note 37, at 672-73. 
 41. Christopher J. Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the Equal Protection Clause: Why the 
Definition of “Equal” Requires a Disproportionate Impact Analysis When Laws Unequally Affect 
Racial Minorities, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 100 (2002) [hereinafter Schmidt, 
Analyzing the Text of the Equal Protection Clause]. 
 42. Prince, supra note 31, at 7. 
 43. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 44. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter 
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION]. 
 45. Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 
(Jackson, J., concurring)).  Not only is intent irrelevant, but, history shows early constitutional 
interpretation did not focus on the Founders’ personal intentions, but on the “original intent” of 
the sovereign parties to the constitutional compact evidenced through constitutional text and 
“discerned through structural methods of interpretation.”  H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985).  But see Charles A. 
Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 93 (1988) 
(arguing that the original intent theory emerged soon after the Constitution was ratified). 
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Therefore, a “court cannot . . . be influenced by the construction placed 
upon [a law] by individual[s]” involved in its debate and passage because the 
will of the majority is spoken in the act itself.46  This means the views of 
draftsmen, such as Alexander Hamilton, bear no more authority than the views 
of non-draftsmen, such as Thomas Jefferson, in determining the meaning of the 
Constitution.47  As James Madison, a draftsman, stated: “[a]s a guide in 
expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the debates and 
incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character.”48  
Madison felt that “the legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be derived 
from the text itself.”49  Thus, he believed the intentions or opinions of those 
that planned and proposed the Constitution should not be used to interpret the 
Constitution’s meaning.50 
The debates at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention were held in 
secret51 and the proceedings were not officially preserved and published.  
Therefore, the original understanding of what occurred there “did not greatly 
matter.”52  Some members of the Philadelphia convention went as far as 
recommending the convention’s journals be destroyed and its minutes 
burned.53 
Similarly, prior drafts of the Third Amendment shed no authoritative light 
on the final amendment’s meaning.  “The text’s the thing,”54 so, we should 
ignore drafting history as opposed to relying on rejected drafts to interpret the 
final, binding version of the Third Amendment.55  The only definite fact we 
know about prior drafts of an amendment or law is that they were rejected.  
Attempting to string together a series of rejected drafts to determine what the 
 
 46. Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845).  See also Philip P. Frickey, 
Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving 
Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 205 n.31 (1999) (directing attention to “Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg 
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 n.† (1998) (noting that Justice Scalia joins in the 
entire opinion with the exception of a section that discusses and rejects a party’s appeal to 
legislative history); Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955 n.[†] (1997) (noting 
that Justice Scalia joins in the entire opinion with the exception of a footnote which discusses and 
rejects the use of legislative history in construing the statute at issue)”). 
 47. Tome, 513 U.S. at 167 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 48. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), reprinted in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 447 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 447-48. 
 51. Paul Finkleman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of 
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 356 (1989). 
 52. Id. at 353. (citing L.W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 2 
(1988)). 
 53. Id. at 353-54. 
 54. Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 283 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. 
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final draft means places rejected versions of an amendment or law in an 
authoritative position when interpreting the final, binding version.  We will 
never know exactly why changes were made to previous drafts of legislation.  
The hundreds, if not thousands, of people associated with drafting and ratifying 
legislation most likely made drafting changes for a multitude of imprecise 
reasons.  Some changes reflect political compromises, some reflect quid pro 
quo scenarios, some reflect political overtones or the issues of the day and 
some simply reflect grammatical or structural concerns.  Just as we cannot put 
our finger on the collective original intent behind a law, we cannot  definitively 
determine why each change was made to each draft of eventually-passed 
legislation. 
Even if we were to plunge into an original intent analysis of the Third 
Amendment, whose intent behind it mattered?56  Should we consider those 
involved in the Philadelphia convention only, or should we include the views 
from those involved in the state ratification conventions as well?57  More 
specifically, “do we [consider the intent of] all those who attended the 
Philadelphia convention, or only those who signed the Constitution?”58  If we 
consider the state conventions, do we consider all those who attended or just 
those who voted for the Constitution?59  And did all those involved intend the 
Third Amendment to mean the same thing, and how would we prove any of 
that?60  With little or no record available concerning the intent of those 
involved in enacting the Third Amendment, we must accept that the original 
intent of the Third Amendment is irrelevant and impossible to determine.  In 
sum, the meaning of the Third Amendment’s text, and not anyone’s intentions 
of it, binds us as law.61 
 
 56. See Prince, supra note 31, at 13. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Finkelman, supra note 51, at 356. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Prince, supra note 31, at 13.  See also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment 
and the “Jurisprudence of Original Intention,” 74 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1721-22 (1986) (citing 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 98–110 (1962) (asserting that the Founders’ intentions cannot be ascertained with 
finality)) (describing the Constitution as not “ratified by a single actor with clear motivations, but 
by many participants, most of whom left little or no record of their intentions”); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal Differences, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 95, 96 (1987) (explaining that many Founders were in Congress and the ratifying 
assemblies, speaking at many times). 
 61. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 44, at 65.  Because the Constitution vests the entire Congress with all legislative powers in 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, the views of a select few in Congress cannot constitute the meaning of a 
law.  See generally Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 44, at 35. 
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C. What is a “Soldier?” 
The definition of soldier is not limited to one narrow meaning.  A soldier is 
“one engaged in military service and [especially] in the army”.62  Similarly, a 
soldier can be “an enlisted man or woman.”63  One engaged in enlisted military 
service is a soldier, but one need not be engaged in such military service to be 
a soldier.  A soldier can also be “a skilled warrior”64 or “a militant leader, 
follower, or worker.”65  Because a soldier can be “a skilled warrior”66 or “a 
militant leader, follower, or worker,”67 a soldier need not be formally linked to 
the armed services.  As such, a broader meaning applies to soldier. 
1. Is a CIA Agent a Soldier? 
The National Security Act created the CIA in 1947.68  The Director of 
Central Intelligence “coordinat[es] the nation’s intelligence activities and 
correlat[es], evaluat[es] and disseminat[es] intelligence [that] affects national 
security.”69  The CIA is responsible to the President through the Director of 
Central Intelligence and accountable to Congress’s intelligence oversight 
committees.70  Thus, the CIA has the general framework of the traditional 
military.  The CIA is part of the executive branch with the President at the top 
of the hierarchy, just as the President, as Commandeer-in-Chief, sits atop the 
armed forces.71 
The CIA’s mission directly relates to military oriented functions.  The CIA 
supports the President, the National Security Council, and all officials who 
make and execute national security policy by “[p]roviding accurate, 
comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence on national security topics.”72  
Furthermore, the CIA operates to ensure that a “battlefield commander . . . 
 
 62. WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 150TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION 1097 
(1981) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S].  See also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1228 (William Morris ed., 1981) [hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE] 
(defining a soldier as one who serves in the army). 
 63. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1097.  See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 
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 64. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1097. 
 65. Id.  See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 1228 (defining a soldier also as an 
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 66. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1097. 
 67. Id.  See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 1228 (defining a soldier also as an 
active or loyal follower or worker). 
 68. Central Intelligence Agency, About the CIA, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/ 
info.html (last modified Jun. 9, 2003) [hereinafter About the CIA]. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 72. About the CIA, supra note 68 (emphasis added). 
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receives the best intelligence possible.”73  To further military-like operations, 
the CIA created special multidisciplinary centers to address issues such as 
counterterrorism, counterintelligence and arms control intelligence.74 
The CIA has separate leadership positions for homeland security 
intelligence and foreign intelligence.  An “Associate Director of Central 
Intelligence for Homeland Security, Office of the Director of Central 
Intelligence, ensures the flow of intelligence in support of homeland 
defense.”75  The CIA also has a Directorate of Operations who “is responsible 
for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence.”76  Accordingly, the CIA, 
as part of its normal operations, transmits intelligence information in order to 
protect the nation from military attack.77 
This description of CIA activities might most directly correlate with the 
job duties CIA or FBI agents would perform in a quartering scenario.  The 
secretive collection of foreign intelligence is exactly what a quartered CIA 
agent would be doing while investigating a terrorist, Iraqi or North Korean 
military plot.  This type of mental combat, or attempting to defeat an enemy 
with the mind instead of the fist, is still military-like activity because a federal 
executive department agent uses his skills and training to defeat an enemy.  It 
is at least the action of a “skilled warrior,”78 as it requires using highly skilled 
tactics in a committed, courageous operation.  A CIA agent, heavily trained in 
intelligence gathering and surveillance, is a skilled servant of the Executive 
Branch, just as an infantryman is a highly trained member of the armed forces 
of the Executive Branch.  Finally, CIA agents committed to preventing another 
terrorist or military attack are dedicated and courageous warriors just like 
traditional infantrymen putting their bodies in front of an enemy bullet. 
The CIA’s Office of Military Affairs (OMA) corroborates the contention 
that CIA agents conduct soldier-like operations.  OMA is designed to provide 
deployed armed forces with “the full range of [the] CIA’s intelligence and 
operational support capabilities.”79  OMA has “military detailees from all the 
uniformed [s]ervices.”80  Thus, the CIA is directly connected with all branches 
of the armed forces.  A military detailee from a uniformed military branch, is 
as close to a traditional soldier as possible. 
More importantly, the OMA internet page contains a handful of pictures 
equating to a thousand words.  The top of the page contains pictures of, from 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See About the CIA, supra note 68. 
 78. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. 
 79. Central Intelligence Agency, OMA at a Glance, at http://www.cia.gov/oma/oma.html 
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left to right, a stealth bomber, a large ship that appears to be an aircraft carrier, 
a uniformed man appearing to be in the Marines and uniformed personnel in a 
tank-like vehicle.81  Below those pictures appears a picture of four hats of the 
armed services.82  These images are undeniably those of soldiers.  If the CIA is 
directly linked with these soldiers in its actions, support and personnel, how 
can a CIA agent not be a soldier as well?  The CIA, through OMA, is 
inextricably linked with the military and armed services.  Consequently, the 
CIA admits it “is a part of the broader ‘military support team.’”83 
If the CIA provides support for the military and is part of the military team, 
how can its agents not be soldiers?  Certainly military personnel of the Air 
Force, Army, Marines and Navy are soldiers.  Because the CIA is part of that 
military support team, its agents are also soldiers.  OMA’s principal business 
involves soldier-like duties including the following: 
Agency support for military exercises; direct support . . . to the commanders in 
chief of the major unified commands; support . . . to the major service schools 
and war colleges; an active training and education . . . program aimed at 
informing [CIA] officers about unique military needs and explaining to 
military audiences how [the] CIA can respond to their requirements; . . . 
[assessing battle damage; assisting in military liaison functions and] ensuring 
systems interoperability between CIA and military sites.84 
OMA’s duties read like a laundry list of military functions that soldiers 
perform.  OMA has its hands in multiple components of military operations, all 
requiring and engaging military goals.  If the CIA’s office is considered the 
Office of Military Affairs, then those agents conducting military duties must be 
soldiers in that capacity.  Accordingly, a CIA agent in this context, quartered 
in a person’s house, would meet the definition of a soldier. 
Finally, the CIA’s role in covert military operations shows its agents are 
soldiers in that capacity.  The CIA “asserted that the [President] has the power 
to authorize the use of covert paramilitary force.”85  Specifically, Special 
Counsel to the CIA argued that the President could undertake covert action 
because of his inherent power to conduct foreign affairs.86  In fact, the United 
States became involved in a foreign, “internal civil [war] through the use of 
private paramilitary forces working under the direction of officers or 
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 82. Id. 
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 84. OMA at a Glance, supra note 79. 
 85. Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten 
Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1986). 
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Foreign Intelligence: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. 1729-
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employees of the CIA.”87  “In the late 1940’s the CIA organized guerrilla 
operations against several eastern European countries, and between 1953 and 
1973 the CIA used paramilitary troops in at least eight major efforts against 
foreign governments.”88  CIA military operations have occurred in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America and the Bay of Pigs in Cuba.89 
The CIA dedicates an entire page on its internet Web site describing its 
actions in the War on Terrorism.90  The CIA’s description of its activities 
against terrorism details how the entire agency confronts terrorism on a global 
scale.  In the mid-1980s, then CIA Director William Casey “created the DCI 
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) [in order to] preempt, disrupt and defeat 
terrorists.”91  According to the CIA, “CTC’s mission is to assist the [CIA 
Director] in coordinating the counterterrorist efforts of the Intelligence 
Community” by implementing counterterrorist operations to collect 
intelligence on and minimize terrorist capabilities, producing in-depth analyses 
of terrorist groups and coordinating the intelligence community’s 
counterterrorist activities.92  The CTC “[f]urnishes daily detailed information 
on terrorist-related intelligence to national-level policymakers from the 
President through sub-Cabinet level officers and members of Congress.”93  
Moreover, it provides intelligence to the State Department for use with foreign 
governments in order to “thwart terrorism.”94  The CTC also provides 
warnings of “impending terrorist operation[s] to those who can counter the 
threat.”95 
The CTC directly supports the military overseas.  CTC’s direct intelligence 
support for the military is its highest priority;96 specifically, the CTC protects 
the military by determining the modus operandi of terrorists that might operate 
 
 87. Id. at 1049. 
 88. Id. at 1050 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-2, at 145, 148 (1977); Falk, CIA, Covert Action and 
International Law, SOCIETY, Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 39, 40-41). 
 89. Id. at 1049 n.64 (citing S. KUMAR, CIA AND THE THIRD WORLD (1981); V. MARCHETTI 
& J. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE 113-25 (1974); P. WYDEN, BAY OF 
PIGS: THE UNTOLD STORY (1979)). 
 90. See Central Intelligence Agency, The War on Terrorism, at http://www.cia.gov/ 
terrorism/index.html (last updated  Jun. 9, 2003).  The CIA is also following the North Korea 
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 91. Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Counterterrorist Center, at http://www.cia.gov/ 
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near United States troops, ensuring that the military receives quick and usable 
intelligence and maintaining direct contact with military intelligence units at 
all major commands.97 
Part of the CTC’s mission is to pursue major terrorists overseas and help 
the FBI bring terrorists to justice.98  The CTC and the FBI “began exchanging 
senior-level officers to help manage the counterterrorist offices at both 
agencies.”99  Through this effort, the United States has brought a number of 
terrorists to justice.100 
The CIA, working with the FBI, seeks to capture terrorists alive when 
possible.101  However, the current Bush Administration prepared a list of 
terrorist leaders the CIA is authorized to kill “if capture is impractical and 
civilian casualties can be minimized.”102  Specifically, President Bush provided 
written legal authority to the CIA to “hunt down and kill the terrorists.”103 
If the CIA performs intelligence, apprehension, analytical and warning 
actions regarding terrorism while arguing for authority to conduct paramilitary 
affairs, then it is admitting that it performs military functions.  The CTC 
confronts terrorists and potential terrorists from as many angles as possible.  
Because President George W. Bush authorized the CIA to capture or kill 
terrorists, those CIA agents following that mission are conducting military 
affairs as soldiers.  Capturing or killing the enemy is a soldier’s basic, 
fundamental role.  Essentially, when the President authorizes a CIA agent to 
capture or kill an enemy, that CIA agent is a soldier.  Any assertion to the 
contrary would be nonsensical. 
The CIA was intricately involved in the war against Iraq even before its 
beginning.  For almost a year before the conflict commenced on March 19, 
2003, the CIA was operating under presidential authority to overthrow Iraqi 
leader Saddam Hussein through covert actions.104  The CIA had “authority to 
use lethal force and a two hundred million dollar budget to bring about a 
change of government.”105  Once again, CIA agents were conducting covert 
actions of a military nature with presidential authority to kill an enemy.  
Besides this type of unquestionably soldier-like activity of trying to topple an 
enemy and kill it, the CIA provided intelligence for the military.  On March 19, 
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2003, before combat started, CIA Director George Tenet and Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld presented President Bush with a plan to launch a 
strategic strike against a location where Hussein and his top commanders were 
believed to be.106  The CIA apparently gained intelligence on Hussein’s 
suspected whereabouts from human intelligence and satellite images.107  After 
meeting with Tenet and others and receiving one last intelligence update, 
President Bush authorized the strategic attack, which occurred at 
approximately 9:45 p.m. eastern standard time.108  Therefore, the conflict 
commenced because of CIA recommendations on where and when to strike 
Iraq.  How much more military and soldier-like can a function be?  The strike 
missed Hussein, and Hussein appeared on Iraqi television shortly after the 
attack.109  The CIA continued its military function though, and confirmed it 
was Hussein, not a body double, appearing on television (but it was unsure if 
the tape was recorded).110  On December 14, 2003, United States troops 
captured Saddam Hussein alive.111 
This description of CIA agents verifies that those agents who are directly 
engaged in intelligence gathering, national security or military affairs would be 
soldiers in a Third Amendment context.  Obviously, those would be the type of 
agents quartered in a house to investigate an enemy.  Thus, in that situation, 
those agents would be soldiers for Third Amendment purposes. 
Regarding the general quartering of CIA agents for protection from 
threatened attacks on their residences and offices, if the type of agent described 
previously was quartered for general purposes, and not to perform any job 
function, the agent would still be considered a soldier because of the agent’s 
basic job functions.  CIA agents not necessarily linked with national security or 
military affairs who would be quartered for general residency purposes only, 
would still meet the textual meaning of soldier.  The agents’ knowledge and 
expertise, coupled with their dedication to the United States, makes them both 
“skilled warriors”112 and “militant leaders, followers, or workers.”113  
Accordingly, under the broad meaning of soldier, CIA agents would be 
considered soldiers under the Third Amendment.  But what of FBI agents? 
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2. Is an FBI Agent a Soldier? 
The FBI is a field-oriented organization that “provide[s] program direction 
and support to fifty-six field offices, approximately 400 satellite offices . . ., 
four specialized field installations, and over forty foreign liaison posts.”114  The 
FBI has approximately 11,000 special agents and 16,000 other employees who 
perform professional, administrative, technical, clerical, craft, trade or 
maintenance operations.115  About 9,800 employees are assigned to FBI 
Headquarters and nearly 18,000 are assigned to field installations.116 
The FBI has an Executive Assistant Director for 
Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence.117 The Counterintelligence Division 
activities include domestic security,118 and it “consolidates all FBI 
counterterrorism initiatives.”119  The FBI’s full-time counterterrorism 
contingent is slightly more than 2,000 agents, but an additional 5,000 to 10,000 
agents can be shifted to prevent domestic terrorism.120  Thus, the FBI is 
countering terrorism or the threat of terrorism.  Accordingly, FBI agents 
rebuffing or preventing terrorism are rebuffing or preventing military attacks.  
Are not those agents’ goals, objectives and mission the same as an enlisted 
soldier rebuffing and preventing terrorism or an enemy military? 
“The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and the National 
Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) are assigned to [the Counterterrorism 
Division].”121  As the FBI states on its internet site: 
The NIPC serves as the US Government’s focal point for threat assessment, 
warning, investigation, and response for threats or attacks against the United 
States’ critical infrastructures.  The NDPO coordinates all federal efforts to 
assist state and local first responders with planning, training, and equipment 
needs necessary to respond to a conventional or non-conventional weapons of 
mass destruction incident.122 
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The NIPC and NDPO are specifically designed as national defense 
organizations underneath the counterterrorism umbrella.  If their national 
defense operations were not labeled under an FBI subdivision, one would 
presume that an armed forces branch or branches conducted them.  Because 
these operations are military operations, military personnel would naturally be 
expected to conduct them. 
The FBI is directly involved with the War on Terrorism.  The media has 
reported that “FBI Director Robert Mueller and other top FBI officials . . . said 
their greatest concern is unknown al Qaeda-backed sleeper cells that may be in 
the United States” ready to commit a terrorist attack.123  To help prevent such 
an attack, known Islamic extremists are under FBI surveillance and the FBI is 
closely monitoring terrorist organization members.124  On the international 
scale, “the FBI continues to upgrade its presence and cooperation with other 
governments” in order to protect United States facilities and interests abroad 
from attack.125  To complete this task and pursue suspected terrorists, the FBI 
stationed agents in forty-five countries.126  The FBI had some success abroad.  
Specifically, it arrested a high-ranking member of al Qaeda, Khalid Shakh 
Mohammed, in the spring of 2003.127  After the arrest, the FBI tried to disrupt 
his financial network overseas and gained valuable information from him.128  
The FBI reportedly learned that a suspected al Qaeda terrorist was planning an 
attack against the United States and it issued a worldwide alert in order to 
locate him.129  In August 2003, federal officials arrested an arms dealer trying 
to sell shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles to an undercover customer 
working for the FBI.130  Around the same time, a truck bomb exploded at the 
United Nations headquarters in Iraq.131  The FBI probe into the attack 
determined that the explosives were similar to those used by Iraq’s armed 
forces.132 
 
 123. FBI Readies Home Front for Wartime, supra note 14.  al Qaeda is a worldwide terrorist 
organization generally considered responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks against the 
United States. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. CNN.com, Mueller: FBI Interviews Useful to War in Iraq, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ 
LAW/03/27/fbi.iraqis/index.html (Mar. 27, 2003). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Shannon McCaffrey, Suspected al-Qaeda Operative is Sought, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER, Mar. 21, 2003, at A23. 
 130. Cnn.com, Feds Tell How the Weapons Sting was Played, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ 
LAW/08/13/arms.sting.details/index.html (Aug. 14, 2003). 
 131. The New York Times, FBI: Iraqi Military-Type Explosives Used in Attack, at 
http://partners.nytimes.com/ref/international/CNN-BOX-ARTICLE.html (last visited Nov. 4, 
2003). 
 132. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
604 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:587 
The FBI is also directly involved in the war against Iraq.  The FBI 
interviewed approximately 10,000 Iraqi citizens and former citizens living in 
the United States.133  According to the FBI, the interviews “helped lead the 
U.S. military to key sites during the war in Iraq.”134  The interviews led to 250 
reports that helped American troops locate, in Director Mueller’s words, 
“weapons production and storage facilities, underground bunkers, fiber optic 
networks, and Iraqi detention and interrogation facilities.”135  The FBI also 
arrested “more than 100 Iraqis of concern to authorities who are believed to be 
in the [United States] unlawfully.”136 
If FBI agents perform soldier-like duties, then they are soldiers.  In this 
instance, the overall description of the FBI’s specific counterterrorism and 
security measures are the type of military duties a soldier would perform to 
combat terrorists or a military enemy.  Moreover, the FBI’s actions in relation 
to the War on Terrorism and the war against Iraq verify that thousands of FBI 
agents perform investigative, preventive, and specific military support 
functions for the United States.  This type of reconnaissance and information-
gathering directly in relation to the War on Terrorism and the war against Iraq 
shows that FBI agents are soldiers in that regard.  Essentially, just as a CIA 
agent quartered in a house to perform intelligence, national security, and 
military affairs is a soldier, so is an FBI agent when acting in that capacity. 
Finally, FBI agents not necessarily linked with intelligence, national 
security, or military affairs (who would be quartered for general residency 
purposes only) would still meet the textual meaning of soldier, just as CIA 
agents in this respect did.  Their knowledge and expertise, coupled with their 
dedication to the United States, makes them both “skilled warriors” and 
“militant leaders, followers, or workers.”137  Consequently, FBI agents meet 
the broad meaning of soldier. 
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D. What is “Time of Peace?” 
The Third Amendment refers to a prohibition against quartering soldiers  
“in time of peace.”138  While peace seems to be the controlling term, the 
amendment’s reference to time of peace refers to when peace occurs or a state 
of peace.  Dictionaries containing a definition for “peacetime” best define what 
the phrase time of peace means because peacetime combines the words within 
the phrase into one word.  Peacetime specifically addresses peace in accord 
with time, blending the phrase “time of peace” into one cohesive word defining 
the phrase at issue.  Accordingly, the term “peacetime” most accurately 
conveys the meaning of time of peace in reference to time of peace and time of 
war. 
With that said, it is necessary to define peacetime.  It is “a time when a 
nation is not at war.”139  Therefore, the meaning of peacetime cannot be 
defined without defining the meaning of war.  In fact, war essentially defines 
peacetime, because peacetime exists when war does not.  Accordingly, a 
further look into what peacetime means can only be done by defining what war 
means.  Once the meaning of war is determined, the definition of peacetime 
will come to bear.  If the United States is at war, then peacetime is not present.  
On the other hand, if the United States is not at war, then peacetime exists.  
Peacetime and war, thus, are mutually exclusive terms.  One cannot exist with 
the other.  Rather, either war exists or peacetime exists. 
E. What is “Time of War?” 
While the meanings of soldier and peacetime appear ascertainable through 
dictionary definitions, the terms war and wartime are more complex.  The most 
appropriate way to define “time of war” is to refer to the meaning of 
“wartime,” just as the term peacetime is the best way to define time of peace.  
Wartime means “a period during which a war is in progress.”140  Therefore, we 
have to define war because wartime exists when a war occurs.  However, the 
word war has been, is and will continue to be one of the most difficult words to 
define in the English language. 
As such, war must be evaluated through its own interpretive paradigm.  In 
other words, just as this article examines what the Third Amendment means 
through its text, history, case law and analogous areas of law, the word war 
must enter and exit this analytical assembly line in order to ascertain its 
meaning.  While the methodology is based on the same framework of this 
article, there is one minor change.  Because case law provides a historical 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
606 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:587 
review of what war is, a historical understanding of war and case law defining 
war are not separate subsections, but a combined subsection discussing the 
historical understanding of war. 
1. The Textual Meaning of War 
“The dividing line between a state of war and a state of peace has never 
been clear.”141  The task of defining war is further exacerbated because it is a 
word that everyone understands the meaning of, but that “few can definitely 
define.”142  Asking what war means “is a question so enigmatic[, for example], 
that [the federal executive and legislative] branches cannot agree . . . on an 
answer any more specific than the [grand] understatement that an unprovoked 
attack on American forces on the scale of Pearl Harbor would . . . [cause the 
President to consider] requesting a declaration of war.”143  To break through 
this confusion and provide a specific meaning of war it must first be 
understood in its two contexts—its ordinary meaning found in dictionaries and 
its legal meaning found in the United States Constitution.   
a. The Legal Meaning of War Applies Over its Ordinary Meaning 
Unlike the terms soldier and time of peace, war has a textual explanatory 
reference in the United States Constitution.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 (the 
Declare War Clause) states: “Congress shall have Power . . . To declare 
War.”144  Therefore, an argument exists that a court cannot take judicial notice 
of a war until Congress, as the war-making body, makes some act or 
declaration creating or recognizing its existence.145 
Thus, before war is defined, the question is whether war should be given 
its ordinary meaning, based on dictionary definitions, or should be given its 
legal meaning based on the Declare War Clause.  On the one hand, the Third 
Amendment does not mention the Declare War Clause, nor does it refer to a 
declaration of war.  The Third Amendment does not state: “No Soldier shall, in 
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor 
in time of [declared] war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law” or “No 
Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent 
of the Owner, nor after [Congress declared] war, but in a manner to be 
prescribed by law.”  Therefore, the ordinary meaning of the key phrase, “time 
of war,” seems to be the textual key to unlocking the word’s meaning.  The 
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argument proceeds that if the Constitution’s Framers wanted to add the 
hypothetical language expressed above, they could have, particularly in light of 
the fact that a federal statute was passed not long after the Constitution was 
ratified containing that type of language.  The Alien Enemy Act146 authorizes 
the President to, among other things, remove certain alien enemies 
“[w]henever there is a declared war . . . or any invasion.”147  Thus, the notion 
is that because Congress expressed that it could premise presidential statutory 
war-power authority on a declared war, the same could have been placed in the 
Third Amendment if a declaration of war was necessary to constitute a war.  
That may appear correct, but it is off-point and off-issue, and thus, incorrect. 
Here, the legal, constitutional meaning of war is at issue.  Because the 
Constitution speaks to what war is and how it commences, that legal, 
constitutional meaning of war must be followed to define what war means in a 
Third Amendment sense.  That requires a reasonable reading of two 
complementary constitutional texts—the Third Amendment and the Declare 
War Clause.  Defining war only through its ordinary meaning would eschew 
the Declare War Clause and apply the ordinary meaning of a word that has a 
constitutional explanatory reference.  The ordinary meaning of war has its 
place—in resolving legal issues surrounding the ordinary meaning of war.  
That, however, is not at issue here. 
Reliance on the ordinary meaning of war provides constitutional 
interpretive problems.  “A text should not be construed strictly . . . or leniently; 
[instead,] it should be construed reasonably, [in order to entail] all that it fairly 
means.”148  With the Constitution providing an explanatory provision for the 
meaning of the word war outside of its reference in the Third Amendment, it is 
unreasonable to interpret war without reference to that constitutional corollary 
and similar provisions balancing congressional and presidential war power.  
Therefore, a purely textualist approach to defining war through its ordinary 
meaning, thereby ignoring its legal meaning, is not a reasonable construction 
of war.149 
 
 146. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000). 
 147. Id. (emphasis added). 
 148. Scalia, supra note 44, at 23. 
 149. If the ordinary meaning of war applied to this issue, the War on Terrorism would not be 
a war, while the war against Iraq and a possible conflict with North Korea would be a war.  
Specifically, a war is “a state of usu. open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or 
nations.” WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1309.  See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 
1444 (defining war as a state of open, armed, and often prolonged conflict carried on between 
nations, states, or parties).  It is “a period of such armed conflict.”  WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 
1309.  See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 1444 (defining war as a period of such 
conflict).  A war is also “a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism.”  WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, 
at 1309.  See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 1444 (defining war as any condition of 
active antagonism or contention or an active state of conflict or contention).  Finally, a war is a 
“struggle between opposing forces or for a particular end” or “to be in active or vigorous 
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conflict.”  WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1309.  While WEBSTER’S indicates that a war can be an 
open and declared conflict, the majority of its meaning indicates that war can occur without a 
declaration.  See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
  At the outset, therefore, the undeclared war against Iraq involving 242,000 United States 
troops, massive military resources, and numerous casualties meets all meanings of war above, 
except for those calling for a declaration. CNN.com, War Tracker: March 19, at 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/war.tracker/03.19.index.html (Mar. 19, 2003) 
[hereinafter War Tracker: March 19]; see supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.  Similarly, 
a traditional ground, air and sea conflict between the United States and North Korea involving 
hundreds of thousands of troops, massive military resources and numerous casualties would meet 
all the meanings of war mentioned previously as well, except those requiring a declaration. 
  On the other hand, the War on Terrorism does not fit the ordinary meaning of war.  First, 
there is no open and declared armed hostile conflict.  While the United States has initiated a War 
on Terrorism, the conflict is against a thing—terrorism—not a nation, state or organization.  
Obviously, a thing, such as terrorism, cannot declare anything.  A conflict, hostility or 
antagonism necessarily appears to involve a dispute between two persons, nations, states or 
organizations.  Thus, it appears textually impossible for a conflict, hostility or antagonism to exist 
in the War on Terrorism because terrorism, a thing, cannot form an opinion, mental state or 
physical confrontation inapposite to the United States.  The declaration of war by some terrorists 
or a terrorist organization like al Qaeda, the organization generally considered responsible for the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, would be insufficient because some terrorists cannot declare 
something for all terrorists.  As time goes on, different actions by different groups can be 
considered terrorism, and a threat of terrorism, to some degree, will always be present.  Thus, as 
the name shows, the “War on Terrorism” seems to be more of a declared policy war, in a national 
security sense, like the War on Drugs is a policy war against the evils of drugs.  Despite the fact 
that this conclusion might textually dispose of the question regarding whether a war could exist, 
given that one participant is only a thing, this article will further analyze if a war can exist against 
terrorism based on war’s meaning incorporating undeclared conflicts. 
  The conflict between the United States and terrorists has not been open.  Instead, it has 
been secretive and closed.  The foundation of the terrorists’ success flows from the secretive 
nature of their whereabouts, training, funding and next form and place of attack.  They apparently 
move from place to place, train from place to place, and attack at different times and places.  
While some aspects of the War on Terrorism are open, such as legislation, funding, and the 
commitment of resources, (see supra note 1), many of the United States’ efforts are secretive as 
well.  These efforts include the prosecution of individuals in military tribunals, secret 
immigration proceedings, the detention of combatants in Cuba and certain CIA and FBI 
intelligence operations.  See supra note 1. 
  Next, the War on Terrorism is not a period or state of armed conflict or similar 
hostilities.  The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were armed.  However, since then, there has 
not been an armed strike against the domestic United States.  The United States quickly unseated 
al Qaeda and the ruling Taliban government in Afghanistan shortly after the first official United 
States and allied air strikes there on October 7, 2001.  Romesh Ratnescar, Afghanistan: One Year 
Later, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/10/timep.afghanistan.year.later.tm/ 
index.html (Oct. 10, 2003).  The United States-led coalition had 11,500 soldiers in Afghanistan 
on September 1, 2003.  Taliban ambush patrols killed eight Afghans.  USA Today, Taliban 
Ambush Patrols, Killing 8 Afghans, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-09-01-afghan-
fighting_x.htm (Sept. 1, 2003).  Fortunately only approximately twenty-five American soldiers 
have died there.  Ratnescar, supra.  Terrorists appear to plan for disputatious bursts of violence, 
while the United States actively attempts to prevent such attacks.  Thus, everyday terrorist 
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Next, a strict interpretation of the Third Amendment focuses on what is not 
said in the amendment as opposed to what is said.  The hypothetical examples 
mentioned previously of language the Third Amendment could contain is not 
what the amendment contains.  While analyzing what an amendment does not 
contain sheds light on its meaning, a look at what it actually contains is 
paramount.  In this instance, because the amendment was ratified after the 
Declare War Clause, there may have been no need to mention in it that a 
declared war had to exist.  This is so because the Declare War Clause already 
existed and explained what war was.  Thus, adding further explanatory 
language in the Third Amendment might have been redundant. 
b. Legal Meaning of the Declare War Clause 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 is the constitutional provision establishing 
Congress’s power to declare war.  While a debate exists concerning whether 
“declare” means “authorize,” there is less dispute that a declaration of war 
alters the legal status of the nation from peacetime to wartime.  The War 
Powers Resolution provides modern legislation describing when Congress 
authorizes the President to execute the armed forces, thereby furthering 
Congress’s power to determine war powers and wartime state of affairs. 
i. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 
This clause states: “Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War.”150 It 
is subject to differing interpretation.  On the one hand, the clause is read (as 
this author believes is accurate) to mean that only Congress can declare or start 
a war, absent an emergency situation wherein the President, as Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces,151 could act unilaterally to defend the United States 
and protect the states from invasion.152  On the other hand, the clause is not 
interpreted as requiring congressional authorization for war, thereby increasing 
presidential war powers.  Fortunately, both sides of the Declare War Clause 
debate express that a declaration of war formally alters peacetime status to 
wartime status; thus, a declaration of war is required to change the Third 
Amendment’s peacetime status to wartime.  This section begins with the 
 
activity appears to be on the planning and preparation side, while United States activity generally 
focuses on investigation and prevention.  Accordingly, neither the facts of the situation, nor the 
apparent objectives of either side constitute a time period or state of armed conflict. 
 150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 151. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 152. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) 
against domestic Violence.”  Id.  See Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F. 
Supp. 1249, 1255 (D.D.C. 1973). 
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argument that a formal declaration is required to begin a war, followed by the 
counter-argument. 
“Declare” is the key word in the Declare War Clause’s statement that 
“Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War.”153  John Hart Ely 
“understands this language to mean ‘[a]cts of war must be authorized by 
Congress.’”154  Because the language grants Congress the exclusive 
responsibility “to resolve the necessity and appropriateness of war as an 
instrument of national policy,” the power is nondelegable.155  In other words, 
“if the power to initiate hostilities is one of Congress’s ‘essential legislative 
functions’ it may not be delegated to the President.”156  Therefore, the text 
reserves to Congress alone the power to pursue “sustained extraterritorial uses 
of direct force.”157  The President is not granted lawmaking or, more 
specifically, war-making power.158  The Constitution proclaims the President 
as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy,159 but no war-making power is 
granted to the President in the Commander-in-Chief Clause.160  Because the 
Constitution grants Congress all the powers naturally connected with the 
power to declare war,161 except the command power, the President does not 
have war-making power absent his ability to repel sudden attacks against the 
United States in an effort to protect its republican form of government and the 
states from invasion under Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.162  The 
 
 153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  See Patrick O. Gudridge, War and Responsibility: A 
Symposium on Congress, the President, and the Authority to Initiate Hostilities, 50 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 81, 82 (1995). 
 154. Gudridge, supra note 153, at 82. (quoting JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 10 (1993)). 
 155. William Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A 
Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1972). 
 156. Bennett C. Rushkoff, Note, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 93 YALE L.J. 
1330, 1335 (1984) (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 
(1935) (determining Congress cannot abdicate or transfer the essential legislative functions with 
which the Constitution vested it)). 
 157. Van Alstyne, supra note 155, at 16. 
 158. Id. at 16-17. 
 159. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 160. Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 41 (1972). 
 161. See infra pp. 174-76. 
 162. Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (D.D.C. 1973) 
(stating that the President has the power under Article IV, Section 4 to use troops or militia to 
quench a civil disorder).  See also Berger, supra note 160, at 41; Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 
613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973); CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & ALLAN IDES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
NATIONAL POWER AND FEDERALISM: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 264 (1998); Edwin B. 
Firmage, Rogue Presidents and the War Powers of Congress, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 79, 80 
(1988) (noting that Congress has complete power to decide on war and peace and the President 
may respond to sudden attacks without Congressional authorization); William M. Goldsmith, A 
New Look at an Old Argument, 11 GEO. MASON. U. L. REV. 65, 77 (1988) (noting President-
made war is justified only in defense of the United States, otherwise Congress should perform its 
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Commander-in-Chief conducts a war; he does not commence, continue or 
conclude one.163  Congress authorizes war; the President commands forces 
after a declaration of war.164 
 
constitutional duties through a small committee drawn from both houses reflecting bipartisan 
leadership); Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1337 (noting that the President may initiate force in an 
emergency based on Commander-in-Chief and executive power); Robert F. Turner, War and the 
Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart Ely’s War 
and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 903, 910 (1994) (noting that declarations are unnecessary 
to defend the nation from foreign aggression or to repel attack).  Some, however, dispute the 
President’s ability to act without a congressional declaration in emergency situations.  One 
commentator went so far as to conclude, “[t]he power of initiating all hostilities belongs to the 
policymaking branch, the Congress.”  Francis D. Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: 
A Critique, 60 CAL. L. REV. 623, 627 (1972).  In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579 (1952), Justice Jackson appeared to overly restrict Presidential power in national 
emergencies when he stated: 
The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inherent powers ex necessitate to 
meet an emergency asks us to do what many think would be wise, although it is 
something the forefathers omitted.  They knew what emergencies were, knew the 
pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready 
pretext for usurpation.  We may also suspect that they suspected that emergency powers 
would tend to kindle emergencies.  Aside from suspension of the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus in time of rebellion or invasion, when the public safety may require it, they 
made no express provision for exercise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis.  I do 
not think we rightfully may so amend their work, and, if we could, I am not convinced it 
would be wise to do so . . . . 
Id. at 649-50 (Jackson, J., concurring).  See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the public safety may require it.”).  However, Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution provides: 
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  That 
text provides specific text-based support for the President to act militarily to protect the United 
States and its form of government in emergency situations.  See Sidak, supra note 143, at 53.  As 
Justice Clark stated: “[T]he Constitution does grant to the President extensive authority in times 
of grave and imperative national emergency . . . . As [President] Lincoln aptly said, ‘[is] it 
possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution?’”  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 
343 U.S. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring) (quoting Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to A.G. 
Hodges (April 4, 1864), reprinted in 10 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 66 (Nicolay 
& Hay ed., 1894)).  To limit Presidential over-stepping in confronting a sudden attack, the grant 
of power to repel sudden attacks on the United States is not to be construed as a presidential 
power to repel an attack by a foreign nation against another foreign nation.  Berger, supra note 
166, at 51, 65 (citing EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 275, 277 (3d ed. 
1948)); Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1343 (citing Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the 
Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 699-701 (1972) (determining that 
the President can initiate a response to a sudden attack against the United States, but cannot 
initiate force abroad during crises)). 
 163. Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1338 (quoting 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 148 
(G. Hunt ed., 1906)). 
 164. Turner, supra note 162, at 905 (citing ELY, supra note 154, at 5). 
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In the exercise of its power, however, Congress need not “declare a total 
war against one or more nations, contemplating effective occupation of their 
territory and capitulation by their governments.”165  “Rather, the [Constitution] 
contemplates congressional . . . declaration of [a] limited war with specifically 
designated objectives [that] the President may . . . pursue through the [armed 
forces] once [Congress articulates] that specific declaration and circumscribed 
objective.”166  Thus, all wars, regardless of their size, and whether or not 
Congress formally declared them, have to be legislatively authorized.167  
“[T]he determination as to whether circumstances . . . make it necessary and 
appropriate to engage in war, however limited in scope or objectives, resides 
solely in Congress subject to no delegation.”168  Therefore, “Congress shall 
decide whether or not the nation is ready to accept the consequences of 
committing itself to war.”169  Essentially, we must follow what the Framers 
wrote in the Constitution and allow Congress to control whether or not the 
nation goes to war.170 
Congress, consequently, determines when peacetime ends and wartime 
commences in a Third Amendment context.  Patrick O. Gudridge followed the 
implications of Ely’s view, stating: 
[P]residential use of military force requires a prior congressional declaration of 
war only if, along with the use of force, the President means to alter the 
ordinary legal rights of American citizens or other persons who come within 
the protection of the . . . Constitution.  Thus, . . . a presidential military effort 
accompanied by relocation of United States residents to internment camps, or 
by a regime of press censorship, would presuppose a declaration of war—or 
rather, in the absence of such a declaration, these accompaniments might well 
be unconstitutional.171 
In other words, “a declaration of war [is] a legislative act[ion] marking a shift 
in governing law.”172  “The words ‘declare war’ are an elision of a longer 
phrase—declare that a state of war exists between the United States and 
another named state.”173  Only a declaration of war alters the legal status of the 
 
 165. Van Alstyne, supra note 155, at 17. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Gudridge, supra note 153, at 82 (citing ELY, supra note 154, at 3). 
 168. Van Alystyne, supra note 155, at 18.  Congress cannot shift the determination to embark 
upon war to the President by treaty because the House of Representatives does not consent to 
treaties, thus, the lower house of Congress would be excluded from the decision-making process.  
Id. at 22. 
 169. J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402, 1425 
(1992) [hereinafter Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens]. 
 170. Charles Bennett et al., The President’s Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus 
Congress’ War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, 29 (1988). 
 171. Gudridge, supra note 153, at 81. 
 172. Id. at 99. 
 173. Wormuth, supra note 162, at 689. 
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nation.  Consequently, anything short of a declaration of war cannot constitute 
a shift from peacetime to wartime status under the Third Amendment.   
The argument against a declaration of war serving as an authorization for 
the President to act as Commander-in-Chief is an incorrect textual 
interpretation.  Some base their argument on historical interpretation.  For 
example, John C. Yoo concludes that “[i]nterpreting ‘declare’ war to mean 
‘authorize’ or ‘commence’ is [an inappropriate] Twentieth-Century 
construct[ion of the Declare War Clause that is] inconsistent with the 
Eighteenth-Century understanding of the [clause].”174  He contends 
international scholars of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries agreed that 
a declaration of war was unnecessary to begin or to wage a war.175  
Accordingly, he believes “[i]t was clearly understood in the eighteenth century 
that a ‘declared’ war was only the ultimate state in a gradually ascending scale 
of hostilities possible between nations.”176 
However, many sources contradict Yoo’s vision.  James Madison, a 
contemporary of the Eighteenth Century, provided a different intellectual 
vision behind declaring war.  He stated: “Is the power of declaring war 
necessary?  No man will answer this question in the negative.  It would be 
superfluous therefore to enter into a proof of the affirmative.”177  Moreover, 
Alexander Hamilton described the President’s war powers as “nothing more 
than the supreme command and direction of the [armed] forces.”178  Hamilton 
noted the power of declaring war appertained to the legislature, not the 
President.179  Ely also noted authority exists supporting “the proposition that 
‘declare war’ and ‘commence war’ were ‘synonymous’ well before the end of 
the eighteenth century.”180  In fact, many scholars from the 1500s to the 1700s 
argued that a declaration of war was unnecessary for defensive actions when a 
nation is attacked, but generally necessary before a nation undertook offensive 
military action.181  Around 1800 there was (and there still is) a difference 
between the United States defending itself from an invasion or a formal 
declaration of war from another nation and it going to war with a nation at 
 
 174. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding 
of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 204 (1996). 
 175. Id. at 206.  See also Bennett et al., supra note 170, at 31 (concluding the United States 
can engage in military operations without a formal declaration of war). 
 176. Yoo, supra note 174, at 205. 
 177. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). 
 178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 179. Id.  See also E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 497 n.7 
(5th ed. 1984) (quoting Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to William Herndon, in 10 
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN I 111-12 (Nicolay & Hay ed., 1894) (concluding the 
Constitution left war-making authority with Congress because no one person should hold the 
power of bringing war upon the nation)). 
 180. Gudridge, supra note 153, at 82 (quoting ELY, supra note 154, at 142 n.21). 
 181. Turner, supra note 162, at 906-10. 
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peace.182 Thus, there is a dispute concerning whether or not a declaration of 
war was unnecessary and did not serve as legislative authorization for the 
President.  It cannot be said, then, that it was clearly understood in the colonial 
era that declare did not mean authorize for war powers purposes. 
Other commentators have listed various potential reasons for Presidential 
war-making power.  One reason is that Congress may only control the 
President’s discretion to use military force abroad by reducing defense funds or 
impeaching him.183  Another is that Presidential power to make war abroad 
need not be based on Commander-in-Chief power, but rather on his executive 
power under Article II of the Constitution.184 
Another view supporting presidential war-making inappropriately blurs the 
line between legislative and executive powers.  In order to dismiss the textual 
command that Congress must authorize war, this view is forced to characterize 
congressional war authorization as a rigid and  mechanical “either/or” logic.185  
Some judicial decisions conjured up intriguing buzz words and phrases that 
describe constitutional war powers provisions as not providing fields of “black 
and white,”186 which leads to the infamous “zone of twilight”187 wherein both 
the President and Congress may act.  Outside of the President’s ability to 
unilaterally act to defend the nation from an attack,188 a straightforward, 
reasonable interpretation of the Constitution shows Congress authorizes war 
and the President commands the military.  This interpretation might not foster 
unique phrases for legal wordsmiths, but it is an accurate constitutional 
interpretation. 
The debate regarding what declare means in relation to Presidential war-
making power is not the specific issue here.  Instead, this article focuses on 
what can change the legal status of the nation from peacetime to wartime under 
the Third Amendment, which is a question with a more universally accepted 
answer.  Congress has the exclusive province to change the nation from a 
 
 182. Wormuth, supra note 162, at 626 (quoting United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). 
 183. Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1334 n.25 (1984) (citing J. Terry Emerson, The War 
Powers Resolution Tested: The President’s Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 187, 214-15 (1975)).  For a thorough review of how congressional appropriation power for 
national defense measures affects the President’s military capabilities, see Peter Raven-Hansen 
and William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commandeer in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 
833 (1994). 
 184. Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1330.  See also id. at 1336 (citing Note, Congress, the 
President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1775 (1968)). 
 185. Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 19, 25 (1970). 
 186. Doe v. Bush, 322 F.3d 109, 110 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 187. Id. at 110 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., 
concurring)). 
 188. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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“state of peace into a state of war.”189  While Yoo concluded that Congress 
does not authorize war through a declaration of war, he nevertheless 
determined that historically a declaration of war notifies citizens of war, 
thereby altering their legal rights and status.190  He argued that historically a 
declaration performs an important function in distinguishing between limited 
hostilities and an all-out conflict or formal war.191  Even though he believes 
that declaration does not authorize war, he recognized that declaring war deals 
with establishing “the formal, legal relationship between two nations.”192  He 
found the following early support for this conclusion from Chancellor Kent: 
[S]ome formal public act . . . should announce to the people at home, their new 
relations and duties growing out of a state of war, and which should equally 
apprize neutral nations of the fact, to enable them to conform their conduct to 
the rights belonging to the new state of things . . .  Such an official act operates 
from its date to legalize all hostile acts, in like manner as a treaty of peace 
operates from its date to annul them.193 
Therefore, a declaration of war announces Congress’s “judgment that a legal 
state of war exists.”194  Specifically, Yoo provided an apt summary of how a 
declaration of war serves as the trigger to alter the nation’s legal status from 
peacetime to wartime.  He stated: 
[The] core function of a declaration of war could be thought to “authorize” war 
by justifying federal wartime policies.  Because the declaration of war has a 
primary domestic effect of notifying the citizens of their new rights and 
obligations, it grants the government a different standard of conduct in relation 
to those rights and duties.  Thus, a declaration of war would permit the 
government to treat its citizens in a way that restricted peacetime liberties in 
favor of a more effective war effort.  The Fifth Amendment . . . generally 
guarantees the right to an indictment or presentment by grand jury for capital 
crimes, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger . . . .  Thus, a 
declaration of war had a domestic function, which permitted new government 
actions in light of the changed legal status of its citizens.  A declaration of war 
did not grant permission for executive action abroad, as we would expect of an 
“authorization” of war, but only set the stage for the exercise of domestic 
wartime powers, primarily by Congress.195 
 
 189. Wormuth, supra note 162, at 626 (quoting United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 
(C.C.D. N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342)). 
 190. Yoo, supra note 174, at 207. 
 191. Id. at 205. 
 192. Id. at 245. 
 193. Id. at 244-45 (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 53-54 (2d. 
ed. 1832)). 
 194. Id. at 246. 
 195. Yoo, supra note 174, at 245-46 (internal citations omitted). 
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Applying Yoo’s analysis, a declaration of war would serve a domestic 
function of notifying the nation that wartime formally exists, thereby alerting 
the citizenry that the President has increased domestic powers that might 
infringe upon civil rights.  Thus, the declaration establishes a legal foundation 
for the people, through their elected representatives, to debate the manner in 
which the compelled quartering of soldiers could take place. 
More specifically, in a Third Amendment context this means that 
peacetime exists until war is declared.  Then, and only then, can wartime exist 
under the Third Amendment.  A declaration of war signifies to the citizenry 
that the legal status of peacetime has formally changed to wartime.  
Accordingly, compelled quartering of soldiers may only occur after a 
congressional declaration of war, even though a conflict meeting the ordinary 
meaning of war might exist before the declaration. 
This parallels the Fifth Amendment’s peacetime and wartime measures.  
The Fifth Amendment guarantees an indictment or presentment by a grand jury 
for capital crimes in peacetime.196  After a congressional declaration of war, 
however, the legal status of affairs switches to wartime and the right to 
indictment and presentment ceases.197  Thus, under the Third Amendment, 
only a congressional declaration of war would switch the legal status of the 
nation to wartime and allow for the compelled quartering of soldiers.  
Following this methodology will provide a clear and consistent standard to 
determine when constitutional peacetime protections convert to wartime status 
under the Third and Fifth Amendments, thus providing a unified constitutional 
framework. 
Without a formal declaration of war, how do the people know when 
wartime starts?  Allowing for the compelled quartering of soldiers without a 
declaration could raise due process concerns.  Without a declaration, how do 
the people receive notice of a change in the national legal status of affairs from 
peacetime to wartime?  The answer is that Congress starts the wartime clock 
with a declaration of war and gives the people notice of the legal change in 
status through a declaration of war. 
This procedure satisfies the Third Amendment’s law-making requirement 
for the compelled quartering of soldiers.  Recall that compelled quartering of 
soldiers in wartime is not always constitutionally acceptable—the compelled 
quartering must occur through a manner prescribed by law.198  In a federal 
sense,199 Congress would have to pass law or laws regulating the quartering of 
 
 196. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 197. Id. 
 198. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 199. The Third Amendment originally only applied to the federal government.  See generally 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the ‘Jurisprudence of Original Intention’, 74 
GEO. L.J. 1719, 1730 (1986); Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the 
Fourth, and Plead the Fifth.  But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 
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soldiers.200  Therefore, congressional action is not only contemplated, but 
required by the amendment.  Accordingly, the amendment’s text sanctions 
formal congressional action and, to allow for compelled quartering during 
wartime, mandates it.  Other congressional action, such as a declaration of war, 
would likewise be appropriate under the amendment.  Congressional action, in 
the form of a declaration of war, to trigger wartime status, squares with the 
amendment’s text.  Subsequent lawmaking prescribing the manner in which 
soldiers could be quartered would necessarily follow the declaration of war.  
Before the manner in which soldiers could be quartered in wartime is 
prescribed, Congress would have to declare war to notify the citizenry that 
wartime supplanted peacetime.  After that, Congress could pass legislation 
prescribing the manner in which the quartering may take place. 
In sum, a formal declaration of war vests the President with extraordinary 
powers in wartime.201  Regardless of whether one believes war can exist 
without a declaration,202 or only through a declaration,203 there appears to be 
less debate that peacetime status cannot convert to wartime status without a 
formal declaration of war, thereby triggering certain statutes and constitutional 
provisions that vest the President with authority not available in peacetime.204 
 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 245 (1988); Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the 
Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. L.J. 759, 774 (1994).  The amendment now applies against the states 
as a fundamental right through the judicially created substantive due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 960-61 (2d Cir. 1982).  This 
author believes that the Third Amendment, and all other provisions of the Bill of Rights, apply 
against the states as well, but through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Schmidt, supra note 24, at 177-78.  Most states protect their citizens from the 
compelled quartering of soldiers as well.  See infra note 418. 
 200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”  Id. 
 201. See generally Sidak, supra note 143, at 93; Sidak, War, Liberty and Enemy Aliens, supra 
note 169, at 1426. 
 202. See Yoo, supra note 174, at 206. 
 203. See generally Sidak, supra note 143, at 93; Sidak, War, Liberty and Enemy Aliens, supra 
note 169, at 1426. 
 204. See Sidak, supra note 143, at 69-70; Sidak, War, Liberty and Enemy Aliens, supra note 
169, at 1425-27; Yoo, supra note 174, at 207, 245-46.  President George W. Bush’s authorization 
for the CIA to kill terrorists defines al Quaeda operatives as “enemy combatants” and “legitimate 
targets for lethal force.”  Risen & Johnston, supra note 101.  President Ford ordered a ban on 
assassinations, which many feel applies to foreign leaders and civilians, although leaders acting as 
military officials in a war (such as Saddam Hussein in the war against Iraq) might be a legitimate 
target in a war.  Id.  This leads to the inevitable complication of a politically declared but legally 
undeclared war that “blur[s] the distinction between enemy combatants and other nonstate 
actors.”  Id. (quoting Harold Hongju Koh).  This leads to two conclusions.  First, the War on 
Terrorism is not a declared war, but a politically declared war that cannot alter peacetime status to 
wartime status.  Second, the designation of enemy combatants does not create a wartime state of 
affairs, but merely blurs the water in certain respects. 
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ii) The War Powers Resolution 
While the Declare War Clause is a constitutional provision designating 
congressional power, The War Powers Resolution,205 a federal statute, 
provides another textual source shedding light on what is war.  It provides: 
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to 
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, 
are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory 
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.206 
There has been a longstanding debate about the statute’s meaning and its 
constitutional legitimacy.207 Unfortunately, the federal Executive and 
Legislative Branches cannot agree on a definition that is essential and 
elemental to the wise governance of the nation in times of crisis.208 
The statute establishes that a congressional declaration of war is not the 
only means available to authorize the President to mobilize the armed forces.  
The statute allows for troop deployment either through a declaration of war, a 
statutory authorization or a national emergency.209  Thus, Congress, by passing 
the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon’s veto,210 indirectly 
concluded that a declaration of war is not the only way in which the President 
could mobilize the armed forces.  Thus, any congressional authorization of 
troop deployment or force does not constitute a declaration of war or a wartime 
state, as two other mechanisms exist to authorize the use of such force.  
Obviously, if Congress chose statutory authorization, as opposed to declaring 
war, then its authorization for military action would fall below a formal 
declaration of war.  Consequently, because war was not authorized in that 
instance, wartime could not exist.  Finally, if the President acted unilaterally in 
a national emergency, without congressional action, that could not constitute 
wartime as the President cannot declare war. 
The statute provides a logical, constitutional allocation of war powers.  A 
reasonable interpretation of the statute shows that a distinction exists between a 
declared war and specific statutory authorization for the President to mobilize 
the armed forces.  The statute divides those congressional powers into separate 
categories.  As such, specific statutory authorization for military action, while 
based on Congress’s power to authorize military action, must be viewed as 
being subsidiary to a formal declaration of war and cannot constitute a wartime 
 
 205. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000). 
 206. Id. at § 1541(c). 
 207. See Sidak, supra note 143, at 32-35. 
 208. Id. 
 209. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2000). 
 210. MAY & IDES, supra note 162, at 264. 
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state of affairs.  Some criticized the resolution because, in their view, it would 
prevent the President from responding to attacks.211  However, Section 1541(c) 
allows the President to act unilaterally in an emergency created by an attack 
against the United States.212  This follows Article IV, Section 4 of the 
Constitution’s mandate that the United States protect individual states from 
invasion.213 
The War Powers Resolution is a constitutionally accurate summary and 
application of war powers, thus, it is a perfectly valid act of Congress.214  
Congress does not have to move to assert authority in war powers.215  The 
Declare War Clause allocates Congress alone with the authority to declare war.  
Therefore, Congress’s passage of the War Powers Resolution is not a 
circuitous, constitutionally suspect maneuver.216  Instead, it is a proper 
statutory provision based on Congress’s ability to enact laws necessary and 
proper to carry into execution its own enumerated powers and all other powers 
vested in the United States government or any officer or department thereof.217 
A congressional declaration of war, as the statute provides, would 
constitute a conversion from peacetime to wartime and sanction the President 
to declare a war.  However, that authorization does not mean that the 
declaration serves only as an authorization or that a declaration is the only way 
to effectuate an authorization of military force.  The statute, by allowing for 
statutory authorization or a national emergency to authorize military action 
proves that a declaration is not the only manner in which Congress can 
authorize the President to conduct military affairs short of war.218 
 
 211. Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1334 (citing Donald E. King & Arthur B. Leavens, Curbing 
the Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution, 18 HARV. INT’L L.J. 55, 80-81 (1977)).  See also 
W. Taylor Reveley III, The Power of War, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF 
FOREIGN POLICY: AN INQUIRY BY A PANEL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 116-17 (Francis Wilcox & Richard Frank eds., 1976); Joseph B. Kelly, Proposed 
Legislation Curbing the War Powers of the President, 76 DICK. L. REV. 411, 415-16 (1972) 
(arguing that the War Powers Resolution is likely unconstitutional because it did not recognize 
the President’s emergency power to repel attacks on foreign allies). 
 212. 50 U.S.C § 1541(c) (2000). 
 213. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 214. See Van Alstyne, supra note 155, at 26.  Similarly, the President cannot use the army 
against the civilian population, except under the most extraordinary circumstances.  Id. at 27; 18 
U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). 
 215. But see Van Alstyne, supra note 155, at 24. 
 216. But see id. 
 217. See id. at 26 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).  See also Alexander M. Bickel, 
Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 131, 140 (1971) 
(determining Congress, through the Necessary and Proper Clause, can do what is necessary and 
proper in carrying out functions conferred upon it; thus, if it is necessary to carry out the declare 
war power by taking measures short of a declaration of war, Congress may do so). 
 218. Another federal statute, 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000), authorizes the President to apprehend, 
restrain, secure, and remove persons fourteen years and older of an enemy nation when there is a 
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In the end, a bedrock principle of our Constitution is that “the nation 
cannot be . . . constitutionally committed to a state of war without the positive 
approval of both houses of Congress.”219  As such, a formal declaration must 
occur for wartime to be present in a reasonable, not strict, interpretation of the 
Third Amendment’s text.220  When a declaration occurs, the nation’s legal 
status changes from peacetime to wartime under the Third Amendment. 
2. Historical Understanding of “War” 
Throughout history, Congress’s war-making power has not prevented 
Presidents from sending the nation’s armed forces into hostilities or situations 
where hostilities were imminent without Congress’s approval.221  “The United 
States has declared war only five times: during the War of 1812, the Mexican-
American War of 1848, the Spanish-American War of 1898, and World Wars I 
(1914) and II (1941).”222  Obviously, those conflicts are considered a war and 
in a Third Amendment context they would constitute a “time of War” under 
the amendment.  However, the United States has committed military forces 
into hostilities abroad at least 125 times since the Constitution’s ratification.223 
Early American history shows Congress can declare war, thereby 
authorizing a formal war or a wartime state of affairs, or it can authorize a 
limited war that does not rise to the level of a formal war.  Either way, 
Congress controls which status exists—a system that Presidents Adams and 
Jefferson subscribed to in the nation’s beginning.224 
 
“declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion 
or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United 
States.”  Id.  Because this statute only comes into effect pursuant to a declared war or defense of 
an attack, it is not illustrative of the United States’ ability to engage in an offensive war absent a 
congressional declaration of such. 
 219. Berger, supra note 166, at 67 n.242 (quoting CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 66 (1951)). 
 220. See Scalia, supra note 44, at 23. 
 221. Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War 
Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 79 (1984). 
 222. Yoo, supra note 174, at 177. 
 223. Id.  See also Berger, supra note 166, at 58 (citing Department of State, Office of the 
Legal Adviser, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, reprinted in 
75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1101 (1966) (stating there were at least one hundred twenty-five instances in 
which the President ordered the military to take action or maintain positions abroad without 
obtaining congressional authorization, starting with the quasi-war with France from 1798-1800); 
Vance, supra note 221, at 79-80 (citing J. Terry Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. VA. L. 
REV. 53, 88-110, 367-68 (1972)) (stating there were “199 United States military engagements 
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 224. See infra notes 423-36 and accompanying text. 
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The Prize Cases225 determined that a war existed without a declaration 
during the Civil War.226  However, the Court noted that a civil war could never 
be declared, that Congress alone can declare war and that Congress and 
President Lincoln essentially followed constitutional war powers when 
Congress authorized and funded military action and President Lincoln 
defended the nation and led the armed forces.227  The Prize Cases’ progeny 
discussed insurance policies of deceased soldiers whose beneficiaries’ claimed 
the deceased passed away during a war under the policy.228  Therefore, those 
cases deal with disputes concerning the ordinary meaning of war, not its legal 
meaning.  Accordingly, because they do not concern a legal, constitutional 
issue, they are irrelevant when determining whether peacetime or wartime 
exists under the Third Amendment. 
Two Supreme Court cases from the mid-Twentieth Century promote the 
correct legal interpretation of war.  The Court established that Congress can 
declare peacetime in one instance and not in another, and each instance must 
be analyzed separately.229  Furthermore, the Court concluded the President 
could not act unilaterally to seize steel plants without Congress authorizing 
such a wartime measure.230 
Finally, modern challenges to the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and 
the war against Iraq affirm Congress’s role as authorizing war and the 
President’s role as executing such wars.231  These challenges affirm that the 
historical understanding of war is that Congress declares war or wartime, and 
the President can only act outside of defensive military measures after such a 
declaration.  Therefore, the President can only order the compelled quartering 
of soldiers after a congressional declaration of war and Congress prescribes a 
manner for their quartering. 
a) Early Conflicts and the Construction of War Powers 
The quasi-war with France from 1798-1800 gave an early indication of 
what constituted wartime.  In the late Eighteenth Century, the French seized 
American vessels.232  Congress did not issue a formal declaration of war, but 
authorized reprisals at sea against French vessels.233 Specifically, Congress 
stated: 
 
 225. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
 226. Id. at 668. 
 227. Id. at 667-68. 
 228. See infra notes 278-291 and accompanying text. 
 229. Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1959). 
 230. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952). 
 231. See infra notes 324-50 and accompanying text. 
 232. Sidak, supra note 143, at 80. 
 233. Id. at 56 (citing Act of July 9, 1978, ch. 68, § 1, 1 Stat. 578; Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 60, 
§ 1, 1 Stat. 578.  See also ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND 
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[T]he President of the United States shall be, and he is hereby authorized to 
instruct the commanders of the public armed vessels which are, or which shall 
be employed in the service of the United States, to subdue, seize and take any 
armed French vessel, which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of 
the United States, or elsewhere, on the high seas . . . .234 
The Supreme Court determined the quasi-war with France was a limited, 
undeclared war.235  The United States’ actions of raising an army, stopping 
intercourse with France, dissolving a treaty with France, building ships for war 
and authorizing private ships to fight French ships showed “the degree of 
hostility meant to be carried on, was sufficiently described without declaring 
war.”236  However, the Court established a distinction between general wars 
and limited wars, wherein general wars are akin to congressional declarations 
of war and limited wars involve military action short of a declaration.237 
The Court viewed a declared war as “solemn, and . . . of the perfect kind[] 
because one whole nation is at war with another whole nation . . . and all the 
rights and consequences of war attach to [the] condition.”238  However, the 
Court stated that “hostilities may subsist between two nations[,] more confined 
in its nature and extent.”239  The Court’s reference to Congress’s ability to 
designate the level of war showed that “Congress is empowered to declare a 
general war, or [it] may wage a limited war [that is] limited in place, in objects, 
[and] in time.240  That power, however, remains with Congress—President 
Adams undertook “absolutely no independent action” during the quasi-war 
with France.241 
The Court did not examine whether a limited war equated to a “time of 
War” as indicated in the Third Amendment (obviously, a declared war means a 
time of war is present in a Third Amendment context), as no quartering issue 
was at hand.  However, the Court thoroughly discussed the different types of 
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 236. Bas, 4 U.S. at 41. 
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 240. Bas, 4 U.S. at 43. 
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military conflicts Congress may authorize and their legal ramifications.242  Yoo 
described: 
[T]he Court held that Congress had the sole power to decide on the legal 
nature of hostilities: whether they would be “general” or “partial,” “public” or 
“private,” “solemn” and “imperfect” or “limited” and “imperfect.”. . .”If a 
general war is declared, its extent and operations are only restricted and 
regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of the law of nations; but if a partial 
war is waged, its extent and operation depend on our municipal laws.”243 
Shortly after Bas Chief Justice Marshall affirmed its holding. 
The whole powers of war being by the [C]onstitution of the United States, 
vested in [C]ongress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our 
guides in this enquiry . . . . [C]ongress may authorize general hostilities, in 
which case the general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, 
in which case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, 
must be noticed.244 
Therefore, if the Constitution vests Congress with the power to initiate a 
limited or general war,245 and Congress determines the nature and extent of 
hostilities, then must not Congress determine when the legal status of the 
nation changes from peacetime to wartime under the Third Amendment?  
Congress’s ability to authorize a limited or general war shows the graduated 
scale of conflicts it may sanction.  If Congress determines that a limited war 
exists, its operations and legal ramifications are limited as well.  On the other 
hand, a general war encompasses the full threshold of wartime operations and 
legal ramifications.  Thus, only a general or declared war constitutes a change 
from peacetime status to wartime status under the Third Amendment.  A 
limited war only operates to meet the partial or limited nature of the war, 
thereby falling short of invoking a full wartime state of affairs.  Congress, 
sanctioned with war-making power, may make the lone determination if 
peacetime or wartime exists under the Third Amendment.  Only Congress’s 
formal declaration of war changes the legal status of the nation from peacetime 
to wartime under the Third Amendment. 
Almost immediately after the quasi-war with France, Tripoli declared war 
against the United States in 1801.246  Tripoli attacked an American vessel, 
 
 242. Yoo, supra note 174, at 290-94. 
 243. Id. at 294 (quoting Bas, 4 U.S. at 43) (emphasis added)).  See also Little v. Barreme, 6 
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which defended itself, and released the attacker.247  President Jefferson 
summarized the event as follows: 
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go 
beyond the line of defense, the vessel, being disabled from committing further 
hostilities, was liberated with its crew.  The Legislature will doubtless consider 
whether, by authorizing measures of offense also, they will place our force on 
an equal footing with that of its adversaries.248 
Jefferson’s statement shows that the United States may defend itself 
without Congressional authorization and that only Congress can authorize 
military action beyond defense from attack.  Therefore, he essentially asked 
Congress to determine whether further offensive military action was 
appropriate.  This humble presidential respect for the Constitution and 
Congress might not be commonplace today, but it shows offensive war-making 
authority lies with Congress alone.  Thus, Congress alone has the power to 
determine when the United States enters wartime, thereby supplanting 
peacetime under the Third Amendment. 
Jefferson’s deference to Congress to determine when wartime existed 
continued.  In 1805, Spain considered action against the United States 
concerning Louisiana’s boundaries.249  Jefferson more directly addressed the 
legal status of the nation.  “Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally 
invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have 
thought it my duty to await their authority for using force.”250  Once again, 
early American history shows Congress alone has the power to alter the United 
States’ legal status from peacetime to wartime.  If that is the case in a use of 
force construct, it must likewise be the case in a Third Amendment context.  
Only a congressional declaration of war switches the peacetime status of the 
nation to wartime. 
b) The Prize Cases 
In the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court concluded the President could 
institute a blockade of Confederate ports during the Civil War, and that the 
right of a prize through capture on the sea of Confederate property was also 
appropriate because it was considered enemy property.251  However, the Court 
instructed that Congress did not have to declare war for the Civil War to 
literally be considered a war because “[a] civil war is never solemnly declared; 
it becomes such by its accidents—the number, power, and organization of the 
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persons who originate and carry it on.”252 While Congress alone can declare 
war, the Court stated “[i]t cannot declare war against a State, or any number of 
States, by virtue of any clause in the Constitution.”253  Furthering this point, 
the Court concluded: 
When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain 
portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their 
allegiance; have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their 
former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the 
contest a war. 
. . . . 
  This greatest of civil wars was not gradually developed by popular 
commotion, tumultuous assemblies, or local unorganized insurrections.  
However long may have been its previous conception, it nevertheless sprung 
forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war.  
The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without 
waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him 
or them could change the fact. 
. . . . 
  They cannot ask a Court to affect a technical ignorance of the existence of 
a war, which all the world acknowledges to be the greatest civil war known in 
the history of the human race, and thus cripple the arm of the Government and 
paralyze its power by subtle definitions and ingenious sophisms.254 
Thus, the Court recognized the unique and constitutionally unchartered setting 
of a civil war wherein a part of the nation engages in war with the 
Government.  As Congress cannot declare war against an individual state or 
states, a civil war cannot be a declared war.  This does not conflict with the 
Court’s holding that the United States, essentially, was at war or in wartime.  A 
civil war appears to be the lone historical exception allowing a wartime state of 
affairs without a declaration of war. 
Furthermore, the Court correctly noted that even in an unprecedented and 
constitutionally unchartered setting, the President and Congress still acted in 
accordance with war powers principles.  The Court correctly concluded that 
when a foreign nation initiates a war by invasion, the President is bound to 
resist force with force.255  In other words, the President does not initiate war 
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but is bound to accept the challenge.256  In considering President Lincoln’s 
acts, we must also consider that “they were triggered by a ‘sudden attack’ on 
American soil, the firing upon Fort Sumter, and this [occurred] when Congress 
was not in session.”257  Thus, Lincoln’s actions fit within his duty to protect the 
republican form of government and the states from invasion under the 
Constitution.258  Accordingly, Lincoln’s domestic defense actions do not create 
precedent for subsequent presidential resistance to a sudden attack on a foreign 
country without congressional authorization.259  In fact, the “[N]ineteenth 
Century . . . offers no example of a President who plunged the nation into war 
in order to repel an attack on some foreign nation.”260 
The Court also addressed whether Congress technically declared war or 
whether other congressional action constituted sufficient legislative sanction of 
the President’s conduct during the war.  The Court stated: 
If it were necessary to the technical existence of a war, that it should have a 
legislative sanction, we find it in almost every act passed at the extraordinary 
session of the Legislature of 1861, which was wholly employed in enacting 
laws to enable the Government to prosecute the war with vigor and 
efficiency.261 
The Court stated, “By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to 
declare a national or foreign war.”262  Moreover, the Court concluded: 
[The President] has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a 
foreign nation or a domestic [s]tate.  But by the Acts of Congress of February 
28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is authorized to . . . use . . . military . . . 
forces . . . in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to suppress insurrection 
against the government of a [s]tate or of the United States.263 
Consequently, the Court affirmed that Congress authorizes war, and the 
President only executes military operations absent the defense of a sudden 
attack on the United States where the President can act unilaterally.264  
Therefore, the careful constitutional balance of war powers wherein Congress 
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determines the existence of war, with the President only executing it absent an 
emergency situation, was not only followed in principle during the Civil War, 
but reaffirmed by the Court.  If Congress, the President and the Supreme Court 
affirmed this paradigm of war powers, even in the most extreme scenario, we 
must also follow it today. 
While President Lincoln, in many respects, followed war powers, in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Douglas appropriately 
rejected President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
during the Civil War.265  “[T]he Constitution implies that the writ of habeas 
corpus may be suspended in certain circumstances but does not say by 
whom[;] President Lincoln asserted . . . it as an executive function.”266  In 
1862, Lincoln unilaterally suspended habeas corpus, which led to the arrest of 
a Maryland Secessionist, John Merryman.267  Chief Justice Taney of the United 
States Supreme Court “issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding the military 
to bring Merryman before him,” which the military refused to follow.268  Then, 
Justice Taney “ruled [Lincoln’s] suspension of habeas corpus unconstitutional 
because the writ could not be suspended without an Act of Congress.”269  
Lincoln ignored the ruling.270  Consequently, Congress ratified his action in 
1863.271  Only after the war was habeas corpus fully restored when the 
Supreme Court ruled that “military trials in areas where the civil courts were 
capable of functioning were illegal.”272 
While the power to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus is not explicitly 
given to Congress, its placement in Article I, wherein Congress’s other powers 
are found, leads to the inference that it is within Congress’s authority.  
Moreover, current precedent is clear that only Congress can suspend habeas 
corpus.273  On the other hand, the Declare War Clause is extremely clear: “The 
Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War.”274  Accordingly, Congress 
alone has the power to determine when wartime exists. 
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Lincoln’s unconstitutional, unilateral suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus is distinct from the Third Amendment’s requirements in another way.  
The Third Amendment allows wartime quartering only through a manner 
prescribed by law.275  Thus, Congress is specifically called upon to pass a law 
or laws regulating the compelled quartering.  Accordingly, would not Congress 
logically be called upon to convert the amendment’s peacetime status to 
wartime status?  This is further verified by Congress’s power to declare war.276  
All textual signs point to Congress, not the President, as having power to 
effectuate wartime status under the Third Amendment. 
In a Third Amendment context, formal text-based lawmaking trumps 
principled government action, which is text-based but not text-compliant.  
Allowing principles and inferences to guide when peacetime converts to 
wartime subjects the protection to political and judicial whim.  Allowing for an 
informal notice of a change from peacetime to wartime contradicts the Third 
Amendment’s formalistic, law-making requirements.  The amendment only 
allows for wartime compelled quartering through a manner prescribed by 
law.277  Therefore, a formal law must be present, even in wartime, for 
compelled quartering to take place.  How then, could an extremely informal 
designation of war, such as congressional statutory authorization through the 
War Powers Resolution or a unilateral Presidential offensive characterized as 
war, trigger the crucial change from peacetime to wartime?  If that were the 
case, then the amendment would allow an informal, implied or inference-based 
change from peacetime to wartime, but the manner to act upon the wartime 
authority would still have to be a formal law.  This type of constitutional 
hopscotch from informal change from peacetime to wartime, and formal 
prescription of how quartering then takes place, would create an illogical and 
inconsistent procedural and substantive application of the Third Amendment.  
Surely, that cannot be what the amendment commands. 
c) The Meaning of “War” Through Insurance Policies 
Many courts came to opposite conclusions concerning whether the United 
States was at war under the insurance policy terms of soldiers killed in 
different military-oriented situations.  The division occurred because of 
different interpretations of the meaning of war within the policies.  A number 
of cases held “that an armed conflict is not a war, in the legal or constitutional 
sense, in the absence of a [congressional] declaration of war.”278  These cases 
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extend Congress’s authority to determine when war exists beyond 
constitutional issues and into contractual interpretations of private insurance 
policies.279  In construing similar clauses that involve “private matters[] 
unaffected by a public interest,” other courts concluded that “courts are free to 
take judicial notice of the existence of a war although no formal declaration of 
war has [occurred].”280  In the end, “[t]he answer [to these disputes] is to be 
found [in] the scope and meaning of the word ‘war.’”281  Essentially, should 
war be construed in its legal or ordinary sense?282 
Obviously, those courts concluding a war can only exist through a 
congressional declaration would likely support a view that wartime can only 
exist through a congressional declaration of war.  Accordingly, applying those 
cases here would mean only a congressional declaration of war could alter the 
peacetime status of the United States to wartime under the Third Amendment. 
Furthermore, those cases holding that under an insurance policy, war can 
be said to exist absent a congressional declaration, also support the view that 
only Congress can determine when war formally exists.  For example, in New 
York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion,283 the court followed insurance and contract law 
principles in determining that a state of war existed under a deceased’s 
insurance policy when the deceased was killed at Pearl Harbor even though 
Congress did not declare war until the day after Pearl Harbor.  The court 
admitted that “a state of war is a political question, to be determined by the 
political department of our Government.”284  It follows that Congress 
determines when wartime exists.  In construing the insurance contract, the 
court determined that if the parties intended war “to mean a state of war . . . 
commenced only [through] a formal [congressional] declaration,” then that 
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meaning would have applied.285  However, the court found that the parties did 
not “use the word war in the technical sense of a formally declared war.”286  
Thus, the court followed the maxim that “words used in insurance contracts . . . 
are to be construed under their plain, ordinary and popular sense, unless it is 
evident . . . that the words were intended to have some other special 
meaning.”287  This led to the court’s conclusion that the deceased died as a 
result of “war or an act incident thereto within the meaning . . . of the insurance 
policy.”288 
The court affirmed the principles that Congress determines when wartime 
formally exists and that the word war has an ordinary and legal meaning.  The 
court gave deference to the political form of government to determine when 
war exists.  It recognized that Congress, through the Declare War Clause, has 
the power to declare war.289  Thus, it is the Legislative Branch of government 
that can switch the United States’ legal status from peacetime to wartime.  
Next, the court only concluded war existed because the insurance contract 
contemplated the ordinary meaning of war, not its legal meaning.290  If the 
parties desired war’s legal meaning to apply, the court would have followed it 
and presumably determined that a formal, declared war did not exist until the 
day after Pearl Harbor.  As such, the court deferred to Congress to address the 
legal issue of whether wartime existed and limited its holding to a conclusion 
that war existed under the ordinary meaning of war under a private insurance 
policy.291 
This condition of war, meeting an insurance policy description, is not the 
same as that which changes the United States’ legal status from peacetime to 
wartime under the Third Amendment.  A condition of war could exist under 
the word’s ordinary meaning.  That does not, however, signify a change in the 
legal status of the nation from peacetime to wartime.  Recovery under an 
insurance policy complies with war’s ordinary meaning within an insurance 
policy, as the parties understood it to mean, while not affecting whether 
wartime existed in a Third Amendment sense.  The determination of whether 
war, within its ordinary meaning, existed under an insurance policy is thus 
distinct from determining if wartime exists under a constitutional amendment 
that protects against compelled quartering of soldiers.  As such, those cases 
concluding that war exists without a congressional declaration for insurance 
policy purposes does not provide any precedential support under the Third 
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Amendment for concluding wartime can exist without a congressional 
declaration of war. 
d) Mid-Twentieth Century Interpretation of Legal War Powers 
In Lee v. Madigan,292 the issue arose of when World War II ended.  The 
United States declared war against Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1941.293  The 
Court provided the appropriate factual summary of when World War II 
concluded.  It stated: 
The Germans surrendered on May 8, 1945, the Japanese on September 2, 
1945 . . .  The President on December 31, 1946, proclaimed the cessation of 
hostilities, adding that ‘a state of war still exists.’ . . .  The war with Germany 
terminated October 19, 1951, by a Joint Resolution of Congress and a 
Presidential Proclamation.  And on April 28, 1952, the formal declaration of 
peace and termination of war with Japan was proclaimed by the President.294 
In Lee, the Court had to decide if a “time of peace” existed on June 10, 1949, 
when a member of the army allegedly engaged in conspiracy to commit 
murder.295  Under Article of War 92, if peacetime existed, he could not be tried 
by a court-martial.296  The Court determined that the United States was in 
peacetime on June 10, 1949, four years after World War II hostilities ceased, 
even though Congress had not yet officially declared peacetime.297  The Court 
discussed how to evaluate the term “time of peace” in different contexts.  The 
Court stated: 
We deal with a term that must be construed in light of the precise facts of each 
case and the impact of the particular statute involved.  Congress in drafting 
laws may decide that the [n]ation may be ‘at war’ for one purpose, and ‘at 
peace’ for another . . . .  The problem of judicial interpretation is to determine 
whether ‘in the sense of this law’ peace had arrived.  Only mischief can result 
if those terms are given one meaning regardless of the statutory context.298 
Following the Court’s holding, the Third Amendment must be considered in its 
context; it must be construed within the circumstances of this article’s 
scenario.  To do otherwise would be akin to specifically engaging in the danger 
the Court warned against—giving the amendment’s terms one meaning 
regardless of their context.  Instead of a universal interpretation of peacetime, 
the Court relied on how civil rights would be impacted by allowing a court-
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martial to occur for an alleged crime committed four years after hostilities 
ceased.  The Court provided: 
We cannot readily assume that the earlier Congress used ‘in time of peace’ in 
Article 92 to deny soldiers or civilians the benefit of jury trials for capital 
offenses four years after all hostilities had ceased.  To hold otherwise would be 
to make substantial rights turn on a fiction.  We will not presume that Congress 
used the words ‘in time of peace’ in that sense.  The meaning attributed to 
them is at war with common sense, destructive of civil rights, and unnecessary 
for realization of the balanced scheme promulgated by the Articles of War.299 
Therefore, under Lee, following a rigid methodology to interpret “time of 
peace” is eschewed by a case-by-case analysis, while Article 92’s impact on 
common sense and civil rights must be taken into account.  In that sense, Lee 
supports reading the Third Amendment in its own light; a light that directly 
affects treasured civil rights.  The Declare War Clause,300 the early history of 
limited wars, and the judicial and executive agreement that Congress controls 
commencing war verify that declarations of war are necessary to alter the 
nation’s legal status of affairs.  As such, common sense would also indicate 
that peacetime converts to wartime under the Third Amendment only when 
Congress declares war. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer301 provided a persuasive 
restriction on presidential power to alter peacetime status to wartime, thereby 
affirming Congress’s authority in that regard.  The Court concluded that 
President Truman was not within his constitutional power when he ordered the 
federal government to take possession of and operate the nation’s steel mills 
absent congressional legislation during the Korean War.302 
In 1950, communist North Korea invaded anti-communist South Korea,303 
which led to the Korean war and United States involvement.304  President 
Truman launched the United States into the war without congressional 
authorization.  A dispute exists as to whether Truman consulted with Congress 
before acting.  Some characterize Truman as unilaterally starting the war305 or 
launching the United States into war without consulting Congress.306  Other 
commentators defended Truman, concluding that he either consulted and 
 
 299. Id. at 236. 
 300. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 301. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 302. Id. at 582-83, 585. 
 303. Search Beat, Korean War History Guide: A Short History of the Korean War, at 
http://history.searchbeat.com/koreanwar.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2003). 
 304. Bickel, supra note 217, at 134. 
 305. See ELY, supra note 154, at 10, 53; see also Wormuth, supra note 162, at 648 (stating 
that President Truman initiated an unauthorized entry into the Korean War). 
 306. ROBERT LECKIE, THE WARS OF AMERICA 858 (1968), cited in, Turner, supra note 162, 
at 950. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] COULD A CIA OR FBI AGENT BE QUARTERED IN YOUR HOUSE 633 
informed Congress before going to war, even though Congress did not pass a 
formal resolution,307 or that his independent actions might have been an 
appropriate response to an emergency.308  The latter fails as the President’s 
unilateral power to respond to emergencies does not extend to defending 
foreign nations from attack.309 
President Truman argued he was acting under his authority as 
Commander-in-Chief to prevent an emergency resulting from the nation-wide 
strike at the steel mills.310  The Court appropriately concluded that a state of 
war did not exist because Congress did not declare war, much like the Court 
looked to Congress’s actions to determine the legal status of the quasi-war with 
France.311  The Court recognized that Congress alone has the power to decide 
if a legal state of war existed to justify President Truman’s actions.312  
Therefore, the Court determined that Truman’s seizure of property was 
unconstitutional because the nation was not formally at war,313 as a declaration 
of war is the only constitutional way in which the nation can formally be at 
war.314  Thus, the Court “correctly held that the President could not usurp 
Congress’ domestic authority” to determine when, legally, a wartime state 
exists.315  Consequently, the Court upheld the principle that a declaration of 
war had important domestic effects, such as notifying the people and 
authorizing Presidential wartime power.316 
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, if read quickly, might appear to 
contradict the conclusion that only a formal declaration of war alters the legal 
status of the nation from peacetime to wartime.  He concluded that “[n]othing 
in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted only to 
Congress.  Of course, a state of war may in fact exist without a formal 
declaration.”317  Jackson qualified his state of war proclamation by stating it is 
unnecessary “to consider the legal status of the Korean enterprise to 
discountenance argument based on it.”318  Moreover, while he assumed the 
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United States was at a war de facto,319 he did not determine if the conflict was 
a war de jure.  Regardless of Jackson’s unsubstantiated claim that a state of 
war can exist without a declaration, his qualification of that remark and his 
ultimate holding validated that a formal declaration of war is needed to alter 
peacetime status to wartime status.  Jackson concluded that the President could 
not “vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his 
own commitment of the Nation’s armed forces to some foreign venture.”320  
“[M]ilitary powers of the Commander-in-Chief were not to supersede 
representative government of internal affairs seems obvious from the 
Constitution and from elementary American history.”321  In other words, 
Jackson determined the power to authorize domestic military power lies in 
Congress, the legislative body, and the power to execute those laws lies with 
the President, the executive body. 
The Constitution’s policy, according to Jackson, is “that Congress, not the 
Executive, should control utilization of the war power as an instrument of 
domestic policy.”322  Consequently, Jackson provided direct support for, at 
least, congressional authorization of wartime in a Third Amendment context.  
Specifically, he said: 
[I]n many parts of the world, a military commander can seize private housing 
to shelter his troops.  Not so, however, in the United States, for the Third 
Amendment says, “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any 
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to 
be prescribed by law.”  Thus, even in war time, his seizure of needed military 
housing must be authorized by Congress.323 
Therefore, if Congress must authorize compelled quartering of soldiers in time 
of war, they must also authorize the time of war.  Because only wartime status 
allows for compelled quartering of soldiers, a congressional authorization of a 
limited war would not rise to the level of a formal, general war, and thus 
wartime would not exist.  Because wartime would not exist, Congress would 
not have the subsequent ability to enact legislation authorizing the quartering 
of soldiers, and the President could not order such quartering to take place. 
e) Modern Undeclared Wars and Challenges to Presidential Authority 
Congressional authorization for the undeclared Vietnam War led courts to 
uphold its constitutionality.  That conflict obviously met the ordinary meaning 
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of war as well.324  Although, as we already know, the crux of the inquiry in 
determining whether a wartime state of affairs existed is if Congress declared 
war or not, Congress did enact the Tonkin Gulf Resolution,325 which 
authorized President Johnson to commit forces in Vietnam.  This was not a 
declaration of war, but rather an authorization for a large-scale limited war.  
Claims that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution somehow created a de facto 
declaration of war are easily refutable because it was subsequently repealed.326  
Unfortunately, the war continued and extended to Cambodia in 1970 and Laos 
in 1971, without consultation with Congress.327 
The constitutionality of the Vietnam War was repeatedly challenged.328  In 
each case, the challenge was denied, but no court supported unilateral 
presidential war-making.  Instead, the courts required and found some form of 
congressional authorization for the undeclared Vietnam War.329  The form of 
authorization for the informal war was within Congress’s discretion—it did not 
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have to formally declare war.330  Furthermore, unilateral Presidential war-
making was appropriately limited to responding to attacks and addressing 
grave emergencies.331  While the courts went too far in concluding that 
unilateral Presidential war-making beyond emergency situations was an issue 
Congress and the President shared, the courts still maintained that Congress 
must authorize or ratify that action.332  Therefore, congressional power to 
authorize war-making was indirectly sustained.  Congressional control over 
determining a wartime state would also follow that mantra. 
Similar to the Vietnam War, Congressional authorization for the 
undeclared Persian Gulf War against Iraq in 1991 led courts to uphold its 
constitutionality.  On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and then President 
George H. W. Bush ordered “the deployment of the largest American combat 
force since the Vietnam War six days later.”333  In November 1990, 
“[President] Bush ordered a virtual doubling of the 230,000 troops in the 
Persian Gulf.”334  On January 12, 1991, Congress passed a joint resolution that 
approved the use of force against Iraq when the President determined and 
reported to Congress that all diplomatic avenues were exhausted.335  The word 
war did not appear in the content of the Iraq Resolution, but rather only 
appeared in the title of the War Powers Resolution.336  The Iraq Resolution 
never said, “A state of war will hereby be declared to exist if Iraq does not 
comply with the various United Nations Security Council resolutions.”337  
“[T]he United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 678, [demanding] 
that Iraq unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.”338  On 
January 17, 1991, the United States initiated “Operation Desert Storm with 
over 1,400 air sorties against [Iraq].”339  On February 24, 1991, the United 
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States commenced a ground invasion of Kuwait and liberated the country three 
days later along with securing an Iraqi pledge to comply with United Nations 
Security resolutions.340 
Leading up to the conflict, fifty-three members of the House of 
Representatives and one Senator sought a preliminary injunction preventing 
President Bush from conducting the Persian Gulf War without a declaration of 
war in Dellums v. Bush.341  The court denied the preliminary injunction 
because it was not ripe for decision.342  Nonetheless, the court stated, “if the 
[Declare] War Clause is to have its normal meaning, it excludes from the 
power to declare war all branches other than the Congress.”343  Moreover, the 
court stated: 
If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any particular offensive 
military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute war-making but 
only an offensive military attack, the congressional power to declare war will 
be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive.  Such an 
“interpretation” would evade the plain language of the Constitution, and it 
cannot stand.344 
The court’s plain and accurate reading of the Declare War Clause indicates 
that only Congress can authorize war.  If Congress does not authorize a war 
and the President nevertheless commences a war, then that war would be 
unconstitutional.  While Dellums does not discuss the Third Amendment, if 
Congress alone has the ability to declare war and the President cannot make 
war on his own volition, then must not Congress declare war to alter the legal 
status of the United States from peacetime to wartime?  That conversion can 
only be accomplished through a formal declaration of war and not through 
informal congressional authorizations.  Therefore, if the President could 
execute the compelled quartering of soldiers without a congressional 
declaration of war, even if Congress prescribed a manner for the quartering, 
that execution would directly contradict Dellums’ principle that Congress alone 
decides whether or not to declare war.  Allowing the President to execute a 
wartime power, such as the compelled quartering of soldiers in citizens’ 
houses, without Congress declaring war, would disregard Dellums and create a 
constitutional inconsistency that would allow the President to execute the 
compelled quartering of soldiers as a wartime measure regardless of whether 
Congress declared war or not. 
Next, if Congress could informally authorize or ratify a President’s 
unilateral order to quarter soldiers, then precedent would be set allowing the 
 
 340. Sidak, supra note 143, at 32. 
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President to undertake formal wartime measures regardless of whether 
Congress declared war.  This would essentially eliminate any reason for 
Congress to formally declare war, as its informal authorization for such 
measures would constitute an equally effective legal sanction as a declaration 
of war.  We must remember informal authorizations and exceptions to the 
formality of the Declare War Clause must be just that—they cannot usurp the 
clause’s actual formal, textual command. 
Essentially, the Persian Gulf War provides a modern view of how 
Congress tends to declare war without declaring war.  It informally declares 
war by “enact[ing] a statute or resolution intentionally styled as something 
other than a declaration of war, such as a ‘limited’ declaration of war.”345  
“Congress did so in its Iraq Resolution of January 12, 1991, which purported to 
authorize the war that President Bush subsequently ordered [and executed] 
against Iraq.”346  The Iraq Resolution’s text, however, did not formally declare 
war on Iraq.347 
While certain members of Congress described the Resolution as essentially 
equivalent to a declaration of war for authorization purposes,348 then House 
Speaker Thomas Foley said a formal declaration of war was not made 
“because there is some question about whether we wish to excite or enact some 
of the domestic consequences of a formal declaration of war-seizure of 
property, censorship, and so forth.”349  While this statement appears to support 
this article’s position that only a formal declaration of war triggers a wartime 
state wherein the President may diminish many rights, such as the Third 
Amendment’s protection against the compelled quartering of soldiers, this 
article will eschew it because original intent is an improper interpretive 
mechanism.350 
In short, we do not need legislators’ alleged intent to determine that the 
Iraq Resolution did not constitute a declaration of war.  The Resolution’s text 
did not declare war, thus no declaration was made.  Accordingly, Congress 
only authorized a limited war with Iraq and did not sanction a formal, declared 
war.  Therefore, the nation’s peacetime legal status remained, and wartime did 
not exist under the Third Amendment. 
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f) A Challenge to President George W. Bush’s Authority to Wage War 
Against Iraq 
Before the war against Iraq, “[a] group of [United States] soldiers, parents 
of soldiers and six [members of the United States House of Representatives] 
filed a lawsuit to stop [President George W. Bush] from launching [the] war 
against Iraq without a [congressional] declaration of war.”351  “The lawsuit 
[sought] an immediate injunction against [President] Bush and Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to prevent them from launching an invasion 
[against] Iraq.”352  The lawsuit contended a congressional resolution of 
October 16, 2002353 “did not specifically declare war and unlawfully ceded the 
decision to [the President].”354  The District Court concluded the lawsuit 
presented a non-justiciable political question, and therefore it dismissed the 
complaint.355  In reference to the plaintiffs’ claim that Congress did not declare 
war, the Court found that Congress expressly endorsed the President’s use of 
the military against Iraq through Congress’s October 16, 2002 resolution.356  
Thus, the court indirectly sanctioned congressional authorization for a limited 
war against Iraq. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s 
decision.357  The First Circuit concluded the dispute was not ripe for 
consideration and the appropriate recourse for plaintiffs’ challenge lay with the 
political branches of government.358  While the opinion might have leaned too 
far towards allowing presidential war-making, it nevertheless accurately 
concluded that the October 2002 resolution constituted congressional 
authorization for the war against Iraq.359  Accordingly, Congress’s power to 
authorize limited or formal war was, to a degree, followed.  As expected, the 
Court did not address what constituted a formal, wartime state of affairs. 
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3. Analogous Constitutional Provisions to the Declare War Clause 
The full balance of war powers indicates that Congress authorizes war, 
while the President executes war.  Congress may “declare [w]ar,”360 “may raise 
and support [a]rmies,”361 may “provide and maintain a [n]avy,”362 may “make 
[r]ules for the [g]overnment and [r]egulation of the land and naval [f]orces,”363 
issue “[l]etters of [m]arque and [r]eprisal,”364 call up the militia,365 organize, 
arm, and discipline the militia366 and make “rules concerning [c]apture on 
[l]and and [w]ater.”367  Finally, in relation to Congress’s powers, “[n]o 
[m]oney shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in [c]onsequence of 
[a]ppropriations made by [l]aw.”368  Because these powers connect with the 
power of declaring war, Congress must also have the power to determine when 
war exists.369  On the other hand, “[t]he President [is the] Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the [m]ilitia of the several 
states.”370  Also, “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every [s]tate in [t]he 
Union a [r]epublican [f]orm of [g]overnment and, shall protect each state 
against [i]nvasion.”371 
These provisions create a constitutional system wherein Congress controls 
every conceivable war-making or war-authorizing power, while the President 
commands the armed forces when Congress authorizes their use and defends 
the nation from attack in emergency situations.  Congress decides if an army or 
navy exists.372  How could the President control whether wartime exists if he 
does not control whether a military force exists to effectuate a war?  Congress 
further controls the military’s funding and regulation and decides if private 
individuals can conduct military operations for the United States by granting 
them commissions, or letters of marque and reprisal.373  The President is left 
only to command any force provided.  In fact, the President may not 
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commence any action except a defense against an attack, an emergency 
situation where states are subject to invasion or their republican form of 
government is threatened.374  Thus, in a constitutional system where essentially 
all war-making and war-authorizing power lay with the Congress, the power to 
declare a wartime state must also lay with Congress.  Essentially, Congress is 
required to “initiate hostilities, not simply [to] act to override unilateral 
[Presidential] action through the use of the funding power.”375  This creates a 
consistent, logical balance of war powers.  Naturally then, reading Congress’s 
power to declare war as a power to declare a wartime status meets the 
analogous war powers present in the Constitution. 
4. Is Wartime Present in the War on Terrorism, Iraq or North Korea? 
These three conflicts reiterate the modern view that a formal declaration of 
war is unnecessary for a President to conduct military affairs, but 
congressional authorization is needed for the President to conduct military 
operations short of a formal war.376  Congress passed two resolutions—one 
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and one in October 2002 
concerning Iraq.  The first resolution authorizes the President to use force 
against terrorists.377  The second resolution authorizes the President to use 
force against Iraq. 378  Neither resolution mentions North Korea and no military 
conflict has occurred with North Korea.  At the outset, therefore, war cannot be 
present with North Korea.  Thus, compelled quartering of CIA or FBI agents 
could only potentially take place during a future war against North Korea.  The 
War on Terrorism and the war against Iraq need further review. 
a) Is Wartime Present in the War on Terrorism? 
Congress authorized President Bush to conduct a limited war in the War on 
Terrorism.379  The Congressional Resolution does not declare war, but rather 
provides: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 
 
 374. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 375. Lobel, supra note 85, at 1079. 
 376. David C. Wright, Comment, America in Vietnam: A Model for the Exercise of the War 
Powers, 15 J. CONTEMP. L. 253, 258 (1989) (citing Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1772; Ratner, 
The Coordinated Warmaking Power—Legislative, Executive and Judicial Roles, 44 S. CAL L. 
REV. 461, 465 (1971)). 
 377. Authorization I, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 378. Authorization II, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). 
 379. For a review of the history and facts of the War on Terrorism, see supra note 1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
642 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:587 
such nations, organizations or persons . . . .  Consistent with [] the War Powers 
Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute 
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of []the War Powers 
Resolution . . . .  Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the 
War Powers Resolution.380 
The Resolution does not declare a war on terrorism or any nation or foreign 
government.  It only authorizes the use of “all necessary and appropriate 
force.”381  The Resolution does not declare war, nor does it mention the word 
war, except for its reference to the War Powers Resolution.  The War Powers 
Resolution, as discussed earlier, authorizes the President to use force through 
“(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization,” or (3) defense of 
the United States.382  Congress chose not to declare war.  Instead it provided 
“specific statutory authorization” for President Bush to use force against 
terrorists.383  Thus, the Resolution cannot be considered a declaration of war.  
Therefore peacetime, in reference to the War on Terrorism, remains the legal 
status of the United States.  The United States is not at wartime under the Third 
Amendment, and compelled quartering of CIA and FBI agents cannot take 
place under the meaning of war during the War on Terrorism. 
b) Is Wartime Present in the War Against Iraq? 
At the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, “Iraq agreed to United 
Nations Security Resolution 687, which required [it to stop developing] 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, destroy all existing weapons . . . 
and their delivery systems, and allow United Nations weapons inspections.”384  
“Iraq . . . repeatedly . . . breach[ed] this agreement . . . [and] ended cooperation 
with the inspections program in 1998.”385  “[T]he United States and other 
nations . . . enforced a no-fly zone near the Kuwaiti border and . . . launched 
missile strikes against Iraq.”386  In 1998, Congress passed a joint resolution 
stating, “Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of its international 
obligations, and . . . the President is urged to take appropriate action, in 
accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to 
bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.”387  Also in 1998, 
Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which authorized assistance for 
“‘Iraqi democratic opposition organizations,’ and declared that it should be 
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United States policy to remove . . . Saddam Hussein from power.”388  The Act 
specifically limited the use of military force by stating it should not “be 
construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed 
Forces.”389  None of the aforementioned congressional enactments declare war 
against Iraq or authorize the use of force against Iraq.  To the contrary, 
Congress specifically precluded such an authorization, and emphasized that the 
Constitution and federal laws, which obviously include the Declare War 
Clause and the War Powers Resolution, should be followed. 
In September 2002, “President Bush called for a renewed effort to demand 
Iraqi disarmament and indicated . . . military force would be necessary if 
diplomacy” failed.390  Iraq allowed weapons inspectors into the country, but 
did not comply with prior United Nations resolutions.391  In October 2002, 
Congress authorized President Bush to conduct a limited war against Iraq.  The 
congressional Resolution did not declare war, but rather provided: 
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he 
determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national 
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and 
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding 
Iraq. 
. . . . 
Consistent with [] the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this 
section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the 
meaning of [] the War Powers Resolution . . . . Nothing in this joint resolution 
supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.392 
Just as the Resolution against terrorism did not declare war, the Iraq 
Resolution did not declare war against Iraq.  It only authorized President Bush 
to “defend the national security”393 and “enforce all relevant United 
Nations . . . resolutions.”394  And just like the Resolution against terrorism, the 
Iraq Resolution’s authorization of force provisions does not mention the word 
war, except for its reference to the War Powers Resolution.  In fact, the Iraq 
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Resolution’s War Powers Resolution provisions in sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(2) 
follow the Resolution against terrorism’s War Powers Resolutions provisions 
in Section 2(b)(1) and 2(b)(2), verbatim.395  Thus, both resolutions chose not to 
declare war.  Instead they both granted “specific statutory authorization” for 
the President to use force.396  Thus, the Iraq Resolution, like the Resolution 
against terrorism, cannot be considered a declaration of war.397 
On March 19, 2003, the United States commenced military action against 
Iraq.398  On May 1, 2003, President Bush stated major combat operations were 
over,399 which essentially constituted a preliminary American victory, as the 
Iraqi leadership was no longer in control of the country.  Since then, however, 
sporadic guerilla warfare-like attacks have been launched against United States 
soldiers.400 
Peacetime, in reference to the war against Iraq, remains the legal status of 
the nation.  Since the start of combat, Congress has not repealed or amended 
the Iraq Resolution, nor has it declared war against Iraq.  Accordingly, the 
United States is not at wartime under the Third Amendment.  Compelled 
quartering of CIA or FBI agents could not take place in a war against Iraq 
under the meaning of war. 
Because this article only starts and complies with the text, it will proceed 
to analyze the historical understanding of the Third Amendment, Third 
Amendment jurisprudence and analogous areas of the law.401 
III.  HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE THIRD AMENDMENT 
A historical understanding of the Third Amendment can support, but not 
carry, a Third Amendment analysis.  History shows what happened over time 
concerning quartering of soldiers and how the founding era dealt with the 
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issue.  Therefore, history can help illustrate why the Third Amendment was 
adopted.  It can also provide persuasive material for how the amendment 
should be interpreted.  History cannot, however, define what the Third 
Amendment means.  Its text should do that.  In this instance, however, with 
little to examine through case law, history provides a more important role in 
determining the Third Amendment’s meaning.  History can help extract the 
doctrinal principles that the Third Amendment’s text has infrequently initiated.  
Fortunately, there is an abundance of historical material providing a continuum 
of consistent values concerning compelled quartering of soldiers in citizens’ 
houses.  The resistance to the compelled quartering of soldiers occurred over 
centuries, with the emphasis being more against the action of government 
agents being quartered in a house than against the specific individual 
quartered.  The nation’s founding debate regarding whether a standing army 
should even exist shows citizen distrust for the soldiery.  It supports a civil 
rights friendly reading of the Third Amendment. 
A. The History of Quartering Soldiers 
The protection against compelled quartering of soldiers in citizens’ houses 
dates back at least to 1628.  “The English Petition of Right of 1628 [stated] 
that ‘great companies of soldiers and mariners have been dispersed into divers 
counties of the realm, and the inhabitants against their wills have been 
compelled to receive them into their houses . . . .’”402  The Petition of Right’s 
mention of mariners, alongside soldiers, shows a prohibition against more than 
just soldiers, but other military oriented government agents quartered in a 
house as well.  A mariner is “one who navigates or assists in navigating a 
ship.”403  Mariners are considered seamen or sailors.404  From a historical view, 
this verifies this article’s textual conclusion that a soldier, as the Third 
Amendment indicates, does not just mean a traditional infantryman.  This early 
prohibition against compelled quartering of soldiers provides an equivalent 
quartering prohibition against traditional members of a Navy.  As flying was 
not yet invented, and thus no Air Force existed, one can conclude that there 
was no way in which a prohibition against pilots, airmen, or a like term was 
possible.405  If such a military force existed, it presumably appears it would 
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 403. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 697; see also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 799 
(defining a mariner as “one who navigates a ship”). 
 404. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 697; see AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 799 
(defining a mariner as “a sailor or seaman”). 
 405. The Constitution authorizes only the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Navy.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  However, a reasonable interpretation of the clause, as well 
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have been subjected to the same quartering prohibition, just as soldiers and 
mariners were.  Accordingly, history shows a broad military quartering 
prohibition, which emphasizes the citizenry’s right against compelled 
quartering as the thrust of the protection, not necessarily the type of person that 
is quartered. 
Therefore, any review of the Third Amendment’s historical development 
must start with a broad notion of the protection in regard to which types of 
persons can be prevented from being quartered.  Thus, the English Petition of 
Right’s principle and the Third Amendment’s historical foundation are 
preserved through modern theory and application.  To foster a narrow 
interpretation of soldier within the Third Amendment would contradict the 
broader mandate of the English Petition of Right.  This would eliminate the 
historical context that the protection formed.  That is an unacceptable historical 
view of the Third Amendment. 
The Third Amendment’s “historical origins [are also] rooted in the English 
Bill of Rights of 1689.”406  The English Bill of Rights provided that the King 
had “endeavoured to subvert . . . the laws and liberties of [the] kingdom . . . 
[b]y raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace, 
without consent of parliament, and quartering soldiers contrary to law.”407  
Britain’s failure to recognize the rights of its citizens regarding compelled 
quartering permeated through British and colonial American history.  One 
commentary noted: 
As a result of the overthrow of James II and the creation of the Bill of Rights 
of 1689, the power of the crown to raise and deploy military forces was 
severely curtailed during the 18th century.  Britain’s failure to apply the same 
restraints in dealing with the American colonists helped lead to the American 
Revolution.408 
Under “the Quartering Act of 1765, the British Parliament required 
American colonists [to pay for] the feeding and sheltering [of] British troops 
stationed” in the colonies.409  The Act authorized the quartering of soldiers in 
inns, livery stables and ale houses if there was insufficient room for them in 
their barracks.410  The Boston Pamphlet of 1772 protested quartering of 
soldiers by stating, “introducing and quartering standing armies in a free 
 
as common sense, leads to an obvious conclusion that the President is the Commandeer-in-Chief 
of the Air Force and the Marines.  Incidentally, that scenario exemplifies why a wholly textualist 
interpretation of the Constitution is inappropriate.  It could lead to an absurd result such as the 
President not being granted command control over the Air Force or Marines. 
 406. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 966 (2d Cir. 1982) (Engblom II) (Kaufman, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 407. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 269 (1999). 
 408. BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND, supra note 402, at 28. 
 409. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 967 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 410. Id. at 967 (citation omitted). 
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country in times of peace without the consent of the people . . . is, and always 
has been deemed a violation of their rights as freemen.”411 
This pronouncement shows the enduring historical prohibition against 
compelled quartering of soldiers.  The Boston Pamphlet emphasized that the 
practice was at all times a violation of the rights of freemen.  This natural-
rights-like position against compelled quartering shows an unyielding stance 
against it, no matter when and where it occurred, and no matter what form of 
government or rights existed.  Accordingly, the Boston Pamphlet enunciated 
the dominant ideological thought of the era—that the government could not 
infringe upon certain natural rights.412  Even with the colonial protest, the 
quartering acts continued.  This increased the tension between colonists and 
the British government, as Judge Kaufman explained in Engblom II: 
The Quartering Act of 1774, one of the “Intolerable Acts” the British 
Parliament enacted as tensions heightened following the Boston Tea Party, 
authorized much more intrusive intervention.  Apparently, before the 
Revolution, the City of Boston provided barracks for British troops only on an 
island in Boston Harbor from which the soldiers could not move quickly to the 
City in the event of an uprising or disturbance by the colonists.  To remedy this 
strategic disadvantage, the Quartering Act of 1774 authorized the British 
commanders to quarter their troops wherever necessary, including the homes 
of the colonists.413 
The Quartering Act “fed ancient fears of billeting a standing army among 
civilians.”414  The gradual colonial resistance came to a climax with the signing 
of the Declaration of Independence.  The resistance directly protested the 
British military presence by stating “the King ‘has kept among us, in times of 
peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislatures.’”415 
Subsequently, the Third Amendment formed from the English Bill of Rights, 
the Virginia Convention Bill of Rights, the Maryland Majority, the state of 
New Hampshire, the New York Bill of Rights, and the North Carolina Bill of 
 
 411. BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND, supra note 402, at 28. 
 412. See David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to 
Professor McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313, 326 (1992); see also Sol Wachtler, Judging the Ninth 
Amendment, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 599 (1991) (citing 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 
395-99 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)). 
 413. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 967 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
also BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND, supra note 402, at 28 (“The Quartering Act authorized 
colonial governors to open uninhabited buildings for the use of soldiers whenever they saw fit.”); 
William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History, 136 MIL. 
L. REV. 1, 25 (1992) (noting that one of the Intolerable Acts authorized the quartering of soldiers 
in private homes of the colonists). 
 414. BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND, supra note 402, at 28. 
 415. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 967 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Rights.416  “[A]fter casting off the yoke of colonial rule,” the Third 
Amendment passed as part of the Bill of Rights.417  Similar provisions were 
passed in many state constitutions and exist to this day alongside the Third 
Amendment.418 
 
 416. LEVY, supra note 407, at 264.  It is not this author’s belief that prior drafts of the Third 
Amendment, or any amendment for that matter, shed authoritative light on interpreting the 
amendment itself.  See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  However, for historical purposes 
only, a progression of the amendment’s text follows: “That no Soldier in time of peace ought to 
be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, and in time of war in such manner 
only as the laws direct.”  LEVY, supra note 407, at 277.  Next, James Madison proposed, “No 
Soldiers shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor at 
any time, but in a manner warranted by law.” LEVY, supra note 407, at 282.  The amendment 
reported by the Select Committee stated, “No soldiers shall in time of peace be quartered in any 
house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law.” LEVY, supra note 407, at 285.  The House of Representatives passed the amendment as, 
“No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, 
nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” See LEVY, supra note 407, at 288.  
The amendment was passed in the Senate in almost the exact same form.  The only change was a 
comma added after the word “house.” LEVY, supra note 407, at 292.   
 417. See Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 966 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 418. Most state constitutions have a provision mirroring the Third Amendment.  Specifically, 
twenty-four state constitutions have provisions paralleling the Third Amendment.  See ALA. 
CONST. art. I, § 28; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 17; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 18; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 
18; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 21; IND. CONST. art. I, § 34; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 15; KAN. CONST. § 
14; ME. CONST. art. I, § 18; MD. CONST. art. 31; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXVII, § 28; MICH. 
CONST. art. I, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 18; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 27; 
N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 16; N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 7; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 31; OHIO. CONST. art. I, § 
13; OR. CONST. art. I, § 28; PA. CONST. art I, § 23; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 19; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 
27; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 25.  Two state constitutions combine language paralleling the Third 
Amendment’s text with language preventing a standing army in peacetime.  See ARIZ. CONST. 
art. II, § 27; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 31.  Ten state constitutions combine language paralleling the 
Third Amendment’s text with language placing military power subordinate to civil power.  See 
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 20; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 22; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 12; MO. CONST. 
art. I, § 24; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 32; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 9; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 14; S.D. 
CONST. art. VI, § 16; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 20; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 25.  Four state 
constitutions combine language paralleling the Third Amendment’s text with language preventing 
a standing army in peacetime and language placing military power subordinate to civil power.  
See ARK. CONST. art. II, § 27; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 5; KY. CONST. § 22; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 19.  
The South Carolina Constitution combines language paralleling the Third Amendment’s text with 
language preventing a standing army in peacetime, language placing military power subordinate 
to civil power and language paralleling the Second Amendment.  See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”).  The West Virginia 
Constitution combines language paralleling the Third Amendment’s text with language 
preventing a standing army in peacetime, language placing military power subordinate to civil 
power and language preventing civilians from being tried or punished in military court.  See W. 
VA. CONST. art. III, § 12.  Eight states, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
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The historical progression of what we now consider Third Amendment 
fears forms a principle of citizen dissolution of being compelled to keep and 
support soldiers in their homes.  The historical evolution of this citizen 
statement has been remarkably clear and unwavering over centuries.  
Moreover, the sentiment never appears to focus on the specific type of soldier 
or army personnel.  While the amendment grew largely out of fear of undue 
influence by the military, a responsible analysis of the amendment must not 
stop there.419  One of the Third Amendment’s purposes was to provide civilian 
control of the military, however, John Hart Ely noted that “there is obviously 
something else at stake, a desire to protect the privacy of the home from prying 
government eyes, to say nothing of the annoyance of uninvited guests.  Both 
process and value seem to be involved here.”420  History shows the complaint 
causing citizen fear, angst and protest is the compelled quartering of 
government military agents, not the specific type of agent quartered.  If the 
type of agent quartered was the key principle, and not the action of compelled 
quartering, then the historical record would not emphasize why traditional 
soldiers, as opposed to the action of the compelled quartering, drew the 
citizenry’s fury.  The long record seems devoid of that emphasis, which 
indicates the colonial protest and subsequent constitutional protection is 
against the compelled quartering of government military agents in the 
citizenry’s houses.  Because the military was much more rudimentary in nature 
during the colonial period, and because there were no sophisticated Executive 
Branch agencies like the CIA or FBI present, the citizenry of that time could 
not launch protests against such agencies.  CIA and FBI agents, many of whom 
perform multiple military duties easily matching the ordinary meaning of 
soldier, are the type of prying government eyes and uninvited guests the Third 
Amendment was designed to protect against.  Thus, to not apply the Third 
Amendment’s prohibitions against CIA or FBI agents would be to ignore the 
amendment’s historical context, outlook and purpose. 
This historical progression of resisting British quartering of soldiers in 
houses shows a consistent aversion toward quartering of soldiers.  The 
quartering was part of a series of actions that pushed the colonies to the 
breaking point, thereby leading to the Declaration of Independence and 
eventually the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, including the Third 
Amendment.  To advance a Third Amendment jurisprudence that would almost 
eradicate the amendment’s protections would fly in the face of the historical 
developments that led to the colonists’ break from British rule and the 
subsequent formation of the United States.  A current constitutional 
 
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin do not have a constitutional provision paralleling the Third 
Amendment. 
 419. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 95 (1980). 
 420. Id. 
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interpretation cutting across the reasoning behind the development of a 
particular right and the overall scheme of the Constitution invalidates the right 
itself.  Such interpretation destroys a layer of the Constitution through 
inappropriate means.  If the people decide to amend or repeal the Third 
Amendment, even in light of its place in historical order, it would be 
permissible.421  Without that step, however, a historical understanding of the 
Third Amendment shows a strong citizen rebuttal toward compelled quartering 
of soldiers. 
History shows the colonists resisted the action of having a government 
military agent quartered in their home without their consent.  The colonists 
objected to providing shelter and food to these soldiers.  The emphasis was not 
on the specific type of government military agent the colonists despised; 
rather, the colonists despised the duty of providing shelter and food to these 
soldiers as well as being forced to shelter unwanted, and potentially prying, 
government eyes.  If the British required compelled quartering of other 
government military agents in houses wherein the owner would have to 
provide free shelter and food, the colonial resistance probably would have been 
the same. 
Finally, as shown above, many CIA and FBI agents perform numerous 
military operations making them soldiers.  These agents perform activities very 
similar to that of a traditional soldier from the colonial era.422  Thus, even if the 
type of government military agent was dispositive in Third Amendment 
interpretation, a CIA or FBI agent quartered in a house to advance these 
military duties while combating a terrorist, Iraqi, or North Korean enemy 
would meet the criteria of a soldier from a historical lens.  CIA or FBI agents 
only meeting the broadest ordinary meanings of soldier, and not the more 
traditional meanings, would still be the type of prying and powerful 
government agent the broad historical prohibition opposed.  Accordingly, 
either type of CIA or FBI agent would be subjected to Third Amendment 
standards. 
B. The Debate Regarding Standing Armies 
Not only did the quartering of soldiers draw ire from citizens through 
British and colonial history, the issue of whether there should even be a 
standing army, or a standing army in peacetime, was a poignant point of debate 
during the forming of the United States and the enactment of the 
Constitution.423  A review of the historical sentiment in favor and against 
 
 421. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 422. Id. 
 423. As stated earlier, debates and drafting history are irrelevant when analyzing a law.  
However, exploring the historical circumstances and general philosophical backdrop to a 
particular issue is an appropriate area to explore in understanding a law. 
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standing armies shows the citizenry’s sentiment toward a military presence.  It 
sheds light on how the Third Amendment should be interpreted.  This does not 
mean that this author believes that original intent now matters.  The 
Constitution speaks to standing armies.  The language controls that 
provision—its drafters’ intentions are irrelevant when interpreting its 
meaning.424  However, to understand the historical understanding and 
philosophical backdrop of the Third Amendment, historical commentary and 
documents on how the citizenry felt about governmental military power in 
peacetime provides persuasive material on how the Third Amendment should 
be interpreted in order for it to correlate with the Constitution’s other 
provisions dealing with military power and civil liberties.  In other words, if 
history shows that the citizenry was skeptical about allowing a standing army 
in peacetime because of its threat to civil liberties, then the Third 
Amendment’s similar provisions for protecting civil liberties against the 
soldiery should align with that sentiment, not contradict it. 
There was a significant citizen sentiment against the mere presence of 
standing armies, particularly in peacetime.  The citizen aversion to the British 
Military presence was eloquently expressed in the Declaration of 
Independence, which contended, “the King ‘has kept among us, in times of 
peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislatures.’”425  Anti-
federalists felt that the federal legislature’s power to raise and support armies 
during peacetime and wartime, and its power to control the militia, 
consolidated government and destroyed liberty.426  Six of the original states 
expressed serious concern about standing armies.  The Pennsylvania and North 
Carolina constitutions stated, “as standing armies in time of peace are 
dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up.”427  New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland’s state constitutions provided, 
“standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up 
without the consent of the legislature.”428 These statements focused on the 
standing army’s threat to liberty.  The soldiers’ power fostered fear in some of 
the citizenry.  However, that does not mean soldiers, in and of themselves, 
 
 424. Therefore, this article will not consider commentary made during the debate regarding 
standing armies at the Philadelphia Convention.  That debate is accounted for in the text of 
Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 425. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 967 (2d Cir. 1982) (Engblom II) (Kaufman, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Great Britain criticized standing armies as well, before 
the American Revolution, by stating “the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom 
in time of peace, unless with the consent of Parliament, was against law.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 
26 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original).  Thus, one may say that the American people 
received “a hereditary impression of [the] danger to liberty from [the presence of] standing 
armies” in peacetime.  Id. 
 426. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST  PAPERS, “Brutus,” Essay I. 
 427. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
 428. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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were the citizenry’s concern.  It was what the soldiers could do, namely 
destroy liberty, that concerned them.  If another government military agent had 
similar power, the citizen fear would be the same.  Government agents, in 
today’s world, capable of the potential destruction of liberty must be equally 
scrutinized alongside the traditional army.  CIA and FBI agents, with powerful 
military, intelligence, and investigative authority, would be the type of liberty-
threatening governmental presence the citizenry would have resisted.  
Applying the same scrutiny to them as the colonists did to the standing army 
would ensure the citizen voice opposing threats to liberty will be heard as 
loudly as it was during the Founding era and before. 
Supporters of a standing army advocated a limited role out of fear of 
governmental oppression of rights.  As the essay of “Brutus” described: 
As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and have often 
been the means of overturning the best constitutions of government, no 
standing army, or troops of any description whatsoever, shall be raised or kept 
up by the legislature, except so many as shall be necessary for guards to the 
arsenals of the United States, or for garrisons to such posts on the frontiers, as 
it shall be deemed absolutely necessary to hold, to secure the inhabitants, and 
facilitate the trade with the Indians: unless when the United States are 
threatened with an attack or invasion from some foreign power, in which case 
the legislature shall be authorised to raise an army to be prepared to repel the 
attack; provided that no troops whatsoever shall be raised in time of peace, 
without the assent of two thirds of the members, composing both houses of the 
legislature.429 
This anti-federalist stance against “troops of any description 
whatsoever,”430 and a requirement that a two-thirds majority assent to raising a 
standing army in peacetime, exemplifies the broad dismay and distrust for 
government military forces and their agents.431  Because sophisticated 
intelligence and investigative executive branch agencies such as the FBI and 
CIA were not present at that time, the anti-federalist sentiment against any 
troops and the federalists’ cautionary support of the military verifies a sizeable 
citizen rebuttal existed to a wide range of government military entities, not just 
traditional soldiers. 
On any scale, James Madison, from a federalist perspective, warned that a 
standing military was “an object of laudable circumspection and 
precaution.”432  He argued the nation “will exert all its prudence in diminishing 
both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be 
 
 429. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST  PAPERS, “Brutus,” Essay X. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. 
 432. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). 
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inauspicious to its liberties.”433  Further cautionary federalist advocacy for the 
standing army came from Alexander Hamilton, who stated: 
[T]he people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination.  The 
laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies—the 
civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted nor confounded with the 
principles or propensities of the other state.  The smallness of the army renders 
the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it; and the citizens, not 
habituated to look up to the military power for protection, or to submit to its 
oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery: They view them with a spirit of 
jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power 
which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.  The army 
under such circumstances, may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small 
faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce 
encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the people.434 
The Constitution eventually codified Congress’s ability to raise a standing 
army, subject to many limitations, presumably to appease those anti-federalists 
opposed to a standing army and following a cautionary federalist advocacy 
paradigm of such forces Hamilton and others advanced.  Specifically, the 
Constitution provides: 
Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support Armies, but no 
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two 
Years; . . . To provide and maintain a Navy; . . . to make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; . . . To provide for 
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions; . . . To provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be 
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States 
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the 
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.435 
Hamilton believed the clause forbidding “the appropriation of money for 
the support of an army for any longer period than two years [is] a 
precaution . . . [that] will appear to be a great and real security against the 
keeping up of troops without evident necessity.436  Accordingly, while the 
federalist position appeared to prevail in the Constitution’s textual grant to 
Congress to undertake many war-making and war-authorizing powers, even 
those who supported Congress’s powers in that regard cautioned against the 
power of a standing army. 
The issues of whether a standing army should exist, and if so, if it should 
exist during peacetime, are not exactly on point with the issue of when and 
 
 433. Id. 
 434. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 435. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12-16. 
 436. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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how compelled quartering of soldiers can take place.  Those issues, however, 
do shed light on how to handle constitutional issues when governmental 
military powers and citizen rights intersect.  If there was a serious intellectual 
debate on whether or not a standing army should even exist, then there were 
serious concerns about the powers of that army.  With proponents of a standing 
army limiting its power and cautioning against its might, there appears to be a 
strong sentiment against military powers and an equally strong sentiment in 
favor of civil rights.  If such sentiments existed, it would seem inconsistent 
with the ideals that built the United States to then advance a Third Amendment 
jurisprudence that would substantially heighten the powers of the military over 
civil rights.  The level of civil skepticism in abdicating power to the military 
would, thus, promote similar civil skepticism against allowing a member of 
that military to be quartered in a citizen’s house without the citizen’s consent.  
Consequently, the Third Amendment must be viewed in accord with the 
relevant historical vision of how the citizenry and a standing army would 
interact.  To that end, a broad reading protecting citizen rights and a narrow 
reading advancing government power in the Third Amendment would be 
consistent with the historical underpinnings of the national debate surrounding 
the military’s power.  A historically sufficient reading of soldier would 
encompass CIA and FBI agents as soldiers, while limiting the compelled 
quartering of them to particular circumstances—those in which Congress 
formally declares war, and a law is enacted describing how quartering may 
take place. 
IV.  THIRD AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Engblom v. Carey, the one case realistically construing the Third 
Amendment, viewed it as protecting civil rights and deterring government 
infringement upon such rights.437  In that case, striking correction officers were 
evicted from their on-site residences in order to quarter National 
Guardsmen.438  The New York Governor “activated the New York National 
Guard . . . to perform security-related functions at state prison facilities” when 
the statewide correction officers’ strike took place.439  The court quickly 
announced the death of Third Amendment legal analysis by stating, “[a]side 
from the lower court’s opinion in this case[,] there are no reported opinions 
involving the literal application of the Third Amendment.”440  The court 
 
 437. See Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982) (Engblom II). 
 438. Id. at 958-59. 
 439. See Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Engblom I), rev’d on other 
grounds, 677 F.2d 957 (1982). 
 440. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 959 n.1 (citation omitted). 
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appropriately eschewed a few prior opinions as “far-fetched, metaphorical 
applications” of the Third Amendment.441 
The issue in Engblom II turned on whether the on-site residences of the 
corrections officers were “houses” under the Third Amendment.  Therefore, 
the opinion did not address the crucial components of this article—what are 
“soldiers,” what is “time of peace” and what is “time of war.”  However, 
because the court reversed a grant of summary judgment that dismissed the 
striking correction officers’ Third Amendment claim, the court had to at least 
minimally address those issues in order to determine a Third Amendment 
claim could proceed.  Moreover, the court’s analysis, while focused on the 
home aspect of the Third Amendment, established a context in which the 
amendment’s terms are to be interpreted and applied.  Thus, by analogy, the 
manner in which “home” was analyzed should be applied to the manner in 
which “soldier,” “time of peace,” and “time of war” should be analyzed. 
The court glanced at the meaning of soldier when it concluded that it 
“agree[d] with the district court’s conclusion that the National Guardsmen are 
‘Soldiers’ within the meaning of the Third Amendment.”442  The District Court 
provided little analysis when it stated “the [National] Guard is the modern day 
successor to the Militia reserved to the states by Art. I, [§] 8, cls. 15, 16 of the 
Constitution, and members of that organization must be considered 
‘soldiers.’”443  A more in-depth analysis might not have been necessary as 
National Guardsmen appear to be enlisted military personnel similar to that of 
traditional soldiers. 
In this respect, the court’s analysis of what house and owner mean are 
more relevant than what it concluded soldier to mean with respect to this 
article.  House and owner do not have a fixed meaning in relation to the 
correction officers who resided in on-site facilities.  Thus, the court, similar to 
this article, had to apply a somewhat unique factual scenario to the Third 
Amendment’s text.  Engblom II had to determine whether or not a correction 
officer who lived on an on-site facility was the owner of a house.444  This 
article determines whether a CIA or FBI agent who is quartered in a house is a 
soldier, and when and how a War On Terrorism, Iraq, or North Korea 
constitutes a time of war. 
 
 441. Id. (citing Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Executives Sec. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 470, 473 n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (concluding that a subpoena does not violate the Third Amendment); Jones v. 
Sec’y of Def., 346 F. Supp. 97, 100 (D. Minn. 1972) (concluding that army reservists’ duty to 
work a parade did not create an incubator and hatchery of swarms of bureaucrats to be quartered 
as storm troopers on the people in violation of the Third Amendment)). 
 442. Engblom II, 677 F.2d. at 961. 
 443. Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Engblom I), rev’d on other 
grounds, 677 F.2d 957 (1982). 
 444. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 959. 
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Engblom II follows a “text-starting” and “broad-finishing” method in 
determining that correction officers who lived in facility-owned residences 
could be owners of houses within the context of the Third Amendment.  The 
court initially noted that the definition of house, “a structure intended for 
human habitation[,] . . . readily encompasses the various modern forms of 
dwelling.”445  The court rejected a “rigid reading of the word ‘Owner’ in the 
Third Amendment.”446  It stated: 
[It] would be wholly anomalous when viewed, for example, alongside 
established Fourth Amendment doctrine, since it would lead to an apartment 
tenant’s being denied a privacy right against the forced quartering of troops, 
while that same tenant, or his guest, or even a hotel visitor, would have a 
legitimate privacy interest protected against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.447 
Accordingly, the court determined that “property-based privacy interests 
protected by the Third Amendment are not limited . . . to those arising out of 
fee simple ownership but extend to those recognized and permitted by society 
[because they are] founded on lawful occupation or possession with a legal 
right to exclude others.”448 
Applying the Engblom II court’s reasoning to the issue in this article, if the 
Third Amendment protects against compelled quartering of soldiers, which 
includes National Guardsmen, it protects against the quartering of CIA or FBI 
agents.  Engblom II commands a broad reading of the Third Amendment’s 
terms.449  While National Guardsmen might, on the surface, share more 
similarities with traditional soldiers than with CIA or FBI agents, the 
similarities between CIA or FBI agents and traditional soldiers in reference to 
their duties against enemy military operatives or terrorists are very similar.  
CIA or FBI agents quartered in a house would be acting as arms of the federal 
government, just as enlisted soldiers represent the federal government.  Their 
purpose or duty would be to protect American citizens against enemy military 
attacks.  The only real distinction would appear to be that certain CIA or FBI 
agents who do not perform military-oriented duties, could be quartered.  This 
distinction, however, is not controlling in a Third Amendment context.  The 
text and history show a broad, enveloping protection from government 
intrusion.  CIA and FBI agents would be subjected to Third Amendment 
 
 445. Id. at 962 n.11. 
 446. Id. at 962. 
 447. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (concluding a person in friend’s 
apartment where narcotics were found was subjected to an unconstitutional search)); United 
States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 333-35 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that hotel room occupants 
enjoy Fourth Amendment protection); United States v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 371 (D.D.C. 1980) 
(concluding an apartment tenant enjoys Fourth Amendment protection). 
 448. Id. at 962. 
 449. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 962. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] COULD A CIA OR FBI AGENT BE QUARTERED IN YOUR HOUSE 657 
prohibitions even if their duties were less military-oriented.  Engblom II’s 
expansive reading of owner creates precedent requiring an expansive reading 
of soldier.  Consequently, CIA and FBI agents, both powerful and skilled 
Executive Branch agents, just like traditional soldiers, would meet the meaning 
of soldier under the Third Amendment jurisprudence Engblom II established. 
We must also remember that the Third Amendment does not enunciate a 
prohibition against compelled quartering of soldiers in houses based upon the 
soldiers’ duty.  Instead, there exists a blanket prohibition.  Regardless of 
whether reconnaissance, combat, or mere residence is taking place because of 
the quartering, a non-consenting house owner during peacetime may refuse to 
allow a soldier to be quartered in his house. 
Finally, Engblom II’s lack of analysis of “soldier,” “time of peace,” and 
“time of war” helped evaluate those terms.  The court assumed peacetime 
existed because it allowed the Third Amendment claim to proceed when the 
National Guard occupied the homes of on-site state correction officers even 
though the quartering was not prescribed through law.  Nowhere in the opinion 
does the court discuss whether or not peacetime or wartime is present, if 
Congress declared war, or if Congress or the state legislature prescribed a 
manner by law regarding how soldiers were to be quartered.  Obviously, if 
wartime were present, a manner prescribed by law to quarter soldiers would 
trump an owner’s disapproval of soldiers staying in his home.  The absence of 
this discussion regarding peace or war infers that a time of peace existed. A 
factual question existed as to whether a soldier was quartered in a home 
without consent of its owner.  Thus, a Third Amendment claim survived 
because in time of peace, an owner must consent to the quartering of a soldier 
in his home.  Further discussion would be necessary if war existed, at least to 
mention that no manner prescribed by law existed to authorize the quartering 
of soldiers without an owner’s consent. 
As such, it appears the court did not believe the Cold War at that time 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, constituted a war.  
Presumably, the court felt this way because either the Cold War did not meet 
the ordinary meaning of war, or Congress failed to declare or authorize war 
against the Soviet Union.  The Cold War was “a state of . . . rivalry existing 
between the Soviet and American blocs of nations following World War II.”450  
This rivalry, or any cold war rivalry for that matter, is “a state of political 
tension and military rivalry between nations, stopping short of actual full-scale 
war.”451  This is important concerning the potential for compelling quartering 
of soldiers during the War on Terrorism.  First, as this article showed 
previously, the War on Terrorism is not between two nations, but rather 
between a nation (United States) and anyone committing, supporting, or aiding 
 
 450. AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 260. 
 451. Id. (emphasis added). 
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terrorism.452  Therefore it is not a cold war.  Second, even if a War on 
Terrorism somehow constitutes a cold war, Engblom II’s silent rejection of the 
Cold War as a time of war creates precedent that public-policy oriented 
conflicts do not constitute a time of war under the Third Amendment.  This 
follows the meaning of a cold war as a conflict not reaching a full-scale war.  
Finally, the War against Iraq is much more than a tense, political conflict.  It is 
a military conflict between two nations, wherein major combat operations took 
place for more than a month.  Thousands of people have died.453  A possible 
military conflict against North Korea, involving numerous troops and weapons, 
would constitute much more than political tension and military rivalry as well.  
Englom II’s Cold War silence would not guide us on the status of that potential 
conflict. 
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES ANALOGOUS TO THE THIRD AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment and the right to privacy parallel the Third 
Amendment’s protection against compelled quartering of soldiers in 
peacetime.  The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures454 establishes a strong protection of citizen’s homes from 
such searches and broadly interprets the type of government agents prohibited 
from conducting unreasonable searches.455  Thus, Fourth Amendment 
principles support a vehement protection of the home from government 
intrusion in a Third Amendment context and cast a wide net against the type of 
persons attempting to be quartered in homes.  The right to privacy protects 
citizens’ fundamental and personal rights from government intrusion.  As the 
Third Amendment helped form this protection of privacy in homes from 
government intrusion, it should follow that the privacy principles and 
guidelines are contained within the broader right to privacy. 
A.  Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  It provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.456 
 
 452. See supra note 149. 
 453. NPR, War in Iraq: Caualites of Conflict, at http://www.npr.org/news/specials/iraq2003/ 
pow.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).  Seven to nine thousand Iraqi civilians have also died.  Id. 
 454. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 455. See id. 
 456. Id. 
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The Fourth Amendment, contrary to the Third Amendment, triggered a 
plethora of interpretive materials.  These materials shed light on how 
constitutional protections against government intrusion upon such rights, 
particularly upon those protected rights within the home, are construed.  The 
Fourth Amendment’s text and subsequent case law announce a strong 
protection of the home from government intrusion.  The amendment’s search 
and seizure prohibitions are at its zenith when government action occurs within 
the home.457  The Fourth Amendment’s protections only apply to searches by 
government agents.458  However, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence broadly 
defines government agents,459 thereby protecting citizens from an array of 
persons conducting unreasonable searches. 
1. The Protection of the Home 
“‘[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording 
of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’”460  “Freedom from intrusion into the 
home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the 
Fourth Amendment.”461  Therefore, the essence of the Fourth Amendment is 
the concept of appreciating the “sanctity of a person’s house.”462  “Without 
question, the home is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment 
protections.”463  Thus, one’s home “has ordinarily [been] afforded the most 
stringent Fourth Amendment protection.”464  The home is the clearest example 
of an area where citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy.465  
Consequently, “one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in [his] home is 
entitled to unique sensitivit[ies] from federal courts.”466  One sensibility is that 
 
 457. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 458. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968). 
 459. Id. 
 460. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. United States 
Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).  See also United States v. Daly, 937 F. Supp. 401, 407 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996); Walls v. Giuliani, 916 F. Supp. 214, 220-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 461. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 389. 
 462. State v. Diaz, 607 A.2d 439, 443 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294 (1967); State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990); State v. Guertin, 461 A.2d 963 
(Conn. 1983)). 
 463. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (citing Harris v. United States, 331 
U.S. 145, 151 n.15 (1947); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)). 
 464. United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1340 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S 543, 561 (1976)).  See also State v. Riggs, 400 S.E.2d 429, 435 (N.C. 
1991) (“[A] private residence is the most highly protected of all places under the Fourth 
Amendment . . . .”). 
 465. Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 466. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1978).  See State v. Platten, 594 P.2d 
201, 205 (Kan. 1979) (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543).  The Fourth Amendment applies 
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).  
This author believes that the Fourth Amendment applies against the states, as well as the rest of 
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a warrantless search inside a home is presumed to be unconstitutional.467  “The 
right of police officers to enter into a home . . . represents a serious 
governmental intrusion into one’s privacy.”468  It was just that type of 
governmental intrusion that the Fourth Amendment was designed to restrict by 
the general requirement of a judicial determination of probable cause before a 
search or seizure could take place.469  “When a citizen withdraws into the 
sanctuary of the home, a governmental intrusion into that sanctuary . . . 
requires a high level of justification.”470 
The Third and Fourth Amendment protections against government 
intrusion into the sanctity of the home should compliment, not contradict each 
other.  The Third Amendment protects against compelled quartering of 
government soldiers in a home,471 while the Fourth Amendment prevents 
unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials in a home.472  The 
Fourth Amendment and the Third Amendment are synonymous in this context.  
Because the Third Amendment follows a similar principle as the Fourth 
Amendment, its interpretation in this respect should follow Fourth Amendment 
interpretation.  Advancing a Third Amendment methodology in accordance 
with the Fourth Amendment fosters legal consistency requiring homes to be 
constantly given great protection against government intrusion.  To allow the 
Fourth Amendment to provide the most stringent protections against 
government entry into the home while leaving the Third Amendment as an 
open floodgate for compelled quartering of soldiers would create an 
inconsistent legal principle in two successive constitutional amendments that 
focus on similar rights.  This type of topsy-turvy legal paradigm cannot stand.  
It would only serve to establish an unbalanced system of constitutional rights 
wherein a government soldier could be quartered in a home at the mere sniff of 
an armed conflict, while a search and/or seizure of that very home could not 
occur absent a warrant, supported by probable cause, and signed by a neutral 
 
the Bill of Rights, through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Schmidt, supra note 24, at 177-78.  See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Amar, supra note 27, at 123-24; Sanders, supra note 
199, at 777; Thomas K. Landry, Unenumerated Federal Rights: Avenues for Application Against 
the States, 44 FLA. L. REV. 219, 223 (1992). 
 467. Pratt v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 795 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (citing Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)); see also People v. Hassan, 624 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993) (concluding that any search or seizure within a home without a warrant is considered 
presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
 468. Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717, 722 (Mass. 1975). 
 469. Id. 
 470. Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); see also Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment’s core is the 
right to retreat into one’s own home and be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion). 
 471. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 472. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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magistrate (unless one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement 
applied). 
This notion also follows Engblom II’s lead when it concluded an apartment 
tenant must be considered an owner under the Third Amendment.  To hold 
otherwise would create a constitutional inconsistency wherein an apartment 
tenant would be denied a privacy right against the compelled quartering of 
troops, while that same tenant, his guest or even a hotel visitor, would have a 
legitimate privacy interest protected against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.473  If the home is to be protected, it must be protected in its entirety.  
If a person’s house is truly his castle,474 its sanctity cannot be upheld in one 
context if it is eradicated in another. 
2. The Broad Meaning of Government Agent 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence also provides guidance on how to 
interpret the term soldier in the Third Amendment.  Fourth Amendment 
protections were “designed to protect the citizenry from abuse of power by the 
sovereign.”475  The amendment’s protections have been broadly interpreted to 
protect against “unreasonable intrusions on the part of all government 
agents.”476  The amendment applies to governmental searches “whether or not 
the ‘police’ conduct the search.”477  Therefore, the Fourth Amendment “applies 
with equal force to executive, legislative, and judicial action.”478  The 
amendment’s applicability has extended to conservation officers,479 fire 
inspectors,480 firefighters,481 a uniformed and armed city housing authority 
patrolman with authority to enforce penal statutes and regulations,482 railroad 
policeman with the power of arrest,483 transit officials,484 public school 
 
 473. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982) (Engblom II). 
 474. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 475. United States v. Williams, 527 F. Supp. 859, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment is intended to 
protect the sanctity of the home and the privacies of life). 
 476. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968). 
 477. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 787 (W.D. Mich. 1975). 
 478. Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1953); see also Swann v. City of 
Dallas, 922 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (concluding that Fourth Amendment protection 
might extend to health, fire or building inspectors whose purposes may be to locate and abate 
suspected public nuisance or to perform routine periodic inspections). 
 479. Richard v. Indiana, 482 N.E.2d 282, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
 480. Schultz v. Alaska, 593 P.2d 640, 642 (Alaska 1979). 
 481. State of Washington v. Bell, 737 P.2d 254, 257 (Wash. 1987). 
 482. Dyas v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 522 P.2d 674, 680 (Cal. 1974). 
 483. United States v. Belcher, 448 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1971). 
 484. Burka v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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officials,485 informants,486 off-duty police officers acting as security guards,487 
off-duty police officers in general,488 airport security personnel,489 and hotel 
employees.490 
More importantly, the specific person or persons conducting a search or 
seizure is not determinative of whether the Fourth Amendment applies.  
Instead, the amendment “applies to a search whenever the government 
participates in any significant way in [the] total course of conduct.”491  
Therefore, the actions of the person or persons involved in the search, as 
opposed to the type of person effectuating the action, are paramount.  The facts 
of each search and seizure are the crucial component of the analysis.  Different 
persons can be government agents at different times for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.  Their behavior surrounding the search and seizure shows whether 
the search amounted to one performed on or behalf of the government.  Thus, 
“courts have engaged in a two prong analysis of ‘allegedly’ private 
searches, . . . separately analyzing the search aspect apart from the actual 
seizure in order to determine whether there was sufficient governmental 
participation in either aspect to require [F]ourth [A]mendment protection.”492 
The Fourth Amendment’s broad interpretation of government agents 
provides protection against searches and seizures that would otherwise violate 
the evidentiary and procedural standards set forth in the amendment.  Thus, the 
core component within the Fourth Amendment is the citizenry’s right to be 
free from these government actions.  Allowing the government to find 
 
 485. In re Doe VIII v. New Mexico, 540 P.2d 827, 831 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); 
Commonwealth v. Carey, 554 N.E.2d 1199, 1201 (Mass. 1990) (concluding that school 
administrators are government actors and that Fourth Amendment strictures apply to their 
conduct); State of Arizona v. Serna, 860 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that 
public high school security personnel were state actors). 
 486. OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1978). 
 487. United States v. Dansberry, 500 F. Supp. 140, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (concluding “where 
private security personnel assert the power of the state to make an arrest or to detain another 
person for transfer to custody of the state” the Fourth Amendment is applicable). 
 488. Smith v. State, 623 So. 2d 382, 385 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (concluding that off-duty 
police officer, acting like an on-duty police officer, had to comply with the Fourth Amendment). 
 489. United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109 n.3 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding that non-
government personnel at airport security checkpoints implicates Fourth Amendment protections 
because of extensive administrative directives by the Federal Aeronautics Administration); 
United States v. Vigil, 989 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a security guard’s 
operation of a metal detector at an airport was state action subject to Fourth Amendment 
protections). 
 490. United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a hotel 
employee’s warrantless search of room was government action because the police acted as 
lookouts for him and his motivation for the search was to gather proof of drug trafficking, rather 
than to ensure that hotel property was not damaged). 
 491. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 492. United States v. Haes, 551 F.2d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1977). 
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somebody else to do its dirty work in order to skirt the Fourth Amendment 
essentially eliminates Fourth Amendment protections.  Therefore, a broad 
interpretation of government agents is required to ensure that the Fourth 
Amendment provides full protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
Applying this methodology to the Third Amendment means that the 
protection against the compelled quartering of soldiers cannot be restricted to a 
narrow interpretation, such as a protection against only enlisted soldiers.  A 
narrow view of soldier would allow the government to violate Third 
Amendment protections by simply disguising its compelled quartering activity 
under the title of another government employee, while still reaching its desired 
result of forcing the compelled quartering of a government agent in one’s 
home.  The Third Amendment should parallel the Fourth Amendment in order 
to create a consistent and ideologically similar framework in two consecutive 
constitutional amendments that provide similar protections. 
To prevent the government from sidestepping Third Amendment 
protections, a narrow view of soldier must be eschewed for an expansive view 
of the term.  Because the Fourth Amendment applies to all government agents 
in order to protect the citizenry from the abuse of the sovereign, the Third 
Amendment should follow an analogous analytical scheme.  This is not to say 
that the Third Amendment applies against any government agent.  That would 
essentially delete the term soldier in the amendment and replace it with 
government agent.  Only the people, through their representatives, can alter a 
constitutional amendment.493  The Fourth Amendment’s text, which does not 
specifically state who cannot institute unreasonable searches and seizures,494 
allows for protection against any legislative, executive or judicial agents used 
to effectuate unconstitutional searches and seizures.495  Because the Third 
Amendment’s text refers to a protection against a soldier, then only a broad 
view of soldier can be applied.  In this instance, CIA and FBI agents are 
Executive Branch employees with military, national security, intelligence or 
investigative duties that are sufficiently similar characteristics and powers to 
that of traditional soldiers.  CIA and FBI agents specifically engaged in 
military, national security, and intelligence actions regarding terrorist, Iraqi, or 
North Korean foes meet a narrow definition of soldier as they are acting to 
defeat or defend against an enemy in a military-oriented confrontation.  Those 
CIA and FBI agents completing different functions still maintain a power and 
responsibility flowing from the Executive Branch (under the supervision of the 
President).  Those agents, acting to some degree in a law enforcement or 
investigative nature, provide the government with information, which, if 
 
 493. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 494. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 495. Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1953). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
664 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:587 
inappropriately used, could lead to it unconstitutionally infringing upon the 
citizenry’s rights.  This type of governmental abuse, caused through Executive 
Branch agents, is exactly the type of abuse the Third Amendment protects 
against. 
B. The Right to Privacy 
The right to privacy is part of the unenumerated fundamental rights 
contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
Clause prevents any state from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”496  Even though the Due Process 
Clause’s text focuses only on the process by which life, liberty, or property 
may be taken, numerous cases interpreted the clause as containing substantive 
rights that are generally immune from state regulation.497 
The right to privacy took full shape in Griswold v. Connecticut.498  
Griswold held a Connecticut statute forbidding the use or assistance in the use 
of contraceptive devices violated the right to privacy.499  The Court found that 
“[v]arious guarantees [in the Constitution] create[d] zones of privacy,” such as 
the right of association in the First Amendment, the right to prohibit the 
quartering of soldiers in homes in times of peace in the Third Amendment, the 
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment, and the right against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, 
and the Ninth Amendment.500  Specifically, Engblom II concluded “[t]he Third 
Amendment was designed to assure a fundamental right to privacy.”501  If the 
Third Amendment was designed to assure privacy and helped to form the right 
to privacy, then Third Amendment jurisprudence must advance citizen privacy 
against government intrusion.  To advance the contrary would limit privacy.  
Therefore, a legal jurisprudence broadly protecting the home follows an 
encompassing definition of soldier, and the requirement that only a formal 
 
 496. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 497. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).  The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause prevents the federal government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Despite the clause’s procedural imperative, 
it has also been interpreted to have substantive content.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 
(1954) (determining that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause contains an equal protection 
component paralleling the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
 498. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 499. See id. at 485-86. 
 500. Id. at 484. 
 501. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982) (Engblom II) (citing Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 484; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Poe, 367 U.S. at 
549 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (concluding 
that the penumbras of the Bill of Rights (of which the Third Amendment is a part) helped form a 
zone of privacy allowing a woman to terminate a pregnancy)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] COULD A CIA OR FBI AGENT BE QUARTERED IN YOUR HOUSE 665 
congressional declaration of war triggers wartime status under the Third 
Amendment. 
A brief review of the Third Amendment shows it strongly favors citizen 
privacy over government action.  It is rather straightforward.  The privacy of 
the citizens in their houses is protected from government intrusion absent 
wartime situations and subsequent legislative action prescribing the manner in 
which that privacy may be infringed.502  However, the Third Amendment’s text 
does not codify narrow rules, but instead involves a broader principle.503  The 
right not to have the government put its agents in one’s home makes little 
sense without some presupposed right not to have the government regiment 
every detail of what one does in the home.504  Therefore, the Third 
Amendment’s purpose of protecting citizen privacy in their homes from 
compelled government quartering of soldiers fosters an indelible privacy-
oriented right.  To effectuate that principle from the Third Amendment’s text 
means that a Third Amendment jurisprudence must advance that privacy 
principle.505 
The historical understanding and structure of the Bill of Rights exemplifies 
that the Third Amendment is an integral part of a constitutional scheme 
protecting civil liberties and civil rights from government intrusion.  The Third 
Amendment codifies a constitutional right that certainly invokes individual 
privacy protection.  Therefore, because the Third Amendment is an integral 
protection in an overall web of liberty, it would take quite a lot to pierce it and 
remove its place within the Bill of Rights.  While this author disagrees with the 
Griswold majority’s substantive due process methodology, this author would 
still conclude the Third Amendment is a proper source to evaluate if a right to 
privacy exists, or if a privacy-oriented unenumerated right exists.  Thus, the 
Third Amendment is considered an authoritative privacy protection against 
government action. 
 
 502. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 503. See Tribe, supra note 61, at 71. 
 504. Id. 
 505. The Ninth Amendment states, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
IX.  It creates a right of privacy.  See Schmidt, supra note 24, at 176; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. 
at 491-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that the conclusion, that the right of privacy in 
marriage does not exist because it is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, violates and 
gives no meaning to the Ninth Amendment).  Instead of evaluating the Third Amendment as part 
of the Bill Rights to determine if it helps form a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court should evaluate the Third Amendment to help determine if 
a unenumerated right to privacy existed under the Ninth Amendment.  See Schmidt, supra note 
24, at 217-18. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Concluding that a CIA or FBI agent is a soldier and that the United States 
is not in wartime until a congressional declaration, complies with the Bill of 
Rights’ civil rights protections and its affirmative rebuttal of government 
infringement upon such rights.  The ordinary meaning of war and its legal 
meaning are quite different.  The ordinary meaning of the word should be used 
to evaluate it in its ordinary construct, such as whether war exists under an 
insurance policy.  On the other hand, the legal meaning of war, which defines a 
wartime state, applies when a legal, constitutional issue of when a time of war 
exists under the Third Amendment.  This analysis provides a reasonable 
interpretation of the Third Amendment because the legal meaning of war in 
one constitutional text, the Third Amendment, parallels another legal meaning 
of it in another constitutional text, the Declare War Clause.  This leads to the 
conclusion that a declared war alone alters the United States’ legal status from 
peacetime to wartime. 
American Presidents showed scrupulous respect for Congress’s authority 
to authorize military action for a century after independence.506  Presidents 
Jefferson and Adams deferred to Congress to authorize military action in early 
American conflicts.  In the Twentieth Century, neither President Wilson in 
World War I nor President Roosevelt in World War II sent troops to engage in 
hostilities on foreign soil until Congress declared war.507  Essentially, “only 
since 1950 have Presidents [asserted] . . . authority to commit the armed forces 
to full scale and sustained warfare.”508  This presidential assertion, however, 
does not constitute a constitutional amendment.  Congress still maintains the 
power to declare war.509  Only the people, through their representatives, can 
amend the Constitution.510  Congress cannot divest itself of its powers and 
transfer them to the President.511  A necessary component of separation of 
powers is that one branch cannot abdicate its power to another branch.512  Even 
powers that are essentially dormant are not lost.513  The history of the legal 
meaning of war shows that Congress, not the President, controls when the 
nation is in peacetime or wartime.  As Congress controls all war-making and 
war-authorizing power and the President only commands forces when 
Congress authorizes their use, absent defense of a sudden attack or 
 
 506. Doe Pls.’ Memorandum at 3 (citing ELY, supra note 154, at 147 n.54). 
 507. Berger, supra note 160, at 68. 
 508. Id. at 67. 
 509. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 510. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 511. Berger, supra note 160, at 68-69. 
 512. Id. at 68. 
 513. Id. at 68-69. 
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emergency,514 Congress must also authorize when the nation is formally in a 
wartime state for Third Amendment purposes. 
The Third Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights.515 The Third 
Amendment’s protections, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, ensure civil rights 
for the citizenry against government action.  Elaborating the Third 
Amendment’s textual meaning in light of the Bill of Rights’ surrounding 
context, portrays an amendment advancing civil liberty within the home 
against government action.516  The Third Amendment is in the midst of 
numerous similarly protected liberties within the Bill of Rights.517  These 
provisions must be viewed as a shield for the citizenry against oppressive 
government conduct.  To interpret the Third Amendment in a way in which the 
protections it contains are rendered null and void would contradict the Bill of 
Rights’ civil rights scheme.  Essentially, that view would create a Bill of 
Rights minus one.  A Third Amendment reading of that kind would place the 
amendment out of step with the remainder of the Bill of Rights. 
In the end, whether the Third Amendment is viewed as containing 
“concrete and specific dispositions”518 or as a foundation for “a periphery 
within which a . . . more capacious elaboration of . . . rights and freedoms . . . 
would remain possible and . . . likely,”519 it is a constitutional provision with a 
meaning that announces a presumption against the compelled government 
quartering of soldiers in a citizen’s house.  The “[C]onstitution is supposed to 
produce workable government, [therefore], . . . [r]esults that are particularly 
awkward, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, were probably not 
intended.”520  The erosion of an amendment within the Bill of Rights places a 
hole in the protective umbrella those amendments create.  One hole in the 
 
 514. See Bickel, supra note 217, at 132. 
 515. The first ten amendments of the United States Constitution are commonly referred to as 
the Bill of Rights. 
 516. See Tribe, supra note 61, at 93. 
 517. The First Amendment protects free speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association, 
and freedom of religion.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Second Amendment, at least to a degree, 
protects the right to bear arms.  U.S. CONST. amend. II.  The Fourth Amendment protects against 
unreasonable search and seizures.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fifth Amendment requires an 
indictment or presentment for certain criminal charges, it protects against self-incrimination, 
prevents taking private property for public use without just compensation, prevents being twice 
subjected to the same offense, and guarantees due process of law.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The 
Sixth Amendment grants the right to counsel, the right to jury trials in criminal cases, the right to 
a speedy and public trial, and the right of the accused to confront witnesses.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI.  The Seventh Amendment allows for civil jury trials in disputes for more than twenty dollars. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  The Eighth Amendment protects against excessive bail, excessive 
fines, and cruel and unusual punishments.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  The Ninth Amendment 
grants individuals rights not enumerated within the first eight amendments.  Id. at amend. IX. 
 518. See Scalia, supra note 44, at 134. 
 519. See Tribe, supra note 61, at 89. 
 520. BORK, supra note 25, at 165. 
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umbrella destroys the umbrella’s overall protection.  Maintaining the Bill of 
Rights’ entire protective umbrella, especially in the Third Amendment, is the 
only way to ensure we all remain dry in a storm of government rain. 
 
